C	ASE 0:06-cv-04112-ADM -JSM Document 607 Filed 02/12/09 Page 1 of 150	1
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA	
3		
4	Fair Isaac Corporation,	
5	Plaintiff,	
6	vs. File No. 06-CV-04112	
7	Equifax, Inc., et al.,	
8	Defendants.	
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10		
11	THE HONORABLE JANIE S. MAYERON	
12	United States Magistrate Judge	
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14		
15	* * *	
16	TAPE-RECORDED HEARING	
17	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
18	* * *	
19		
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21		
22	Date: 12-5-08	
23	Reporter: Lisa M. Thorsgaard	
24		
25		

## **APPEARANCES**

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MR. RONALD J. SCHUTZ, MR. MICHAEL A.

4 | COLLYARD, and MR. RANDALL TIETJEN, Attorneys at

5 Law, 800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2800, Minneapolis,

6 Minnesota 55402-2015, appeared on behalf of

7 Plaintiff.

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9

MR. JACK E. PACE, MR. CHRISTOPHER J.

11 GLANCY and MR. ROBERT A. MILNE, Attorneys at Law,

12 | 1155 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York

13 | 10036, appeared on behalf of Defendant Experian.

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MR. CHRISTOPHER R. SULLIVAN, Attorney

17 at Law, Suite 4200, 80 South Eighth Street,

18 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, appeared on behalf

19 of Defendant Experian.

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21

MR. CHRISTOPHER R. MORRIS, Attorney at

23 Law, 33 South Sixth Street, Suite 3800,

24 | Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402-3707, appeared on

25 | behalf of Trans Union.

## PROCEEDINGS

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(NO REPORTER WAS PRESENT - the following transcript of proceedings was prepared from a COPY of the original court tape recording)

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THE COURT: We have individuals calling in, so before I have everyone introduce themselves, I'm going to

11 technology works.

Hello, Magistrate Judge Mayeron.

wait for that call to come in, see how this

MR. GARDNER: Good afternoon,

Your Honor. Thank you for facilitating this.

It's Jim Gardner.

THE COURT: Mr. Gardner. I

can hear myself very well because I'm on a

18 microphone but I'm having a hard time hearing

19 you. So just speak a little more and you may

have to turn up the volume or we may have to

21 at this end.

MR. GARDNER: Okay. Is this a

23 little better?

24 THE COURT: Let's see here.

25 Hang on. Why don't you tell us where you are

right. Okay. We're here in the courtroom
this afternoon in -- let me ask if you're
having any trouble hearing me or any of the
parties as they speak or attorneys, you let us
know. Just jump right in.

We're here this afternoon on the matter of Fair Isaac Corporation v. Equifax, et al., except Equifax is no longer a party but it still shows up as the lead party on the defendants' side of the case. This is Court File 06-4112.

First of all, I'd like to ask the attorneys to the parties to introduce themselves. And then I know we have third parties who are here as well.

Let's start with Fair Isaac

Corporation. Who is here this afternoon on behalf of them?

MR. SCHUTZ: Good afternoon,
Your Honor. Ron Schutz with the Robins,
Kaplan firm on behalf of Fair Isaac. Also in
court with me today are my colleagues, Randy
Tietjen and Mike Collyard. Also present,
in-house counsel for Fair Isaac, Renee
Jackson.

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                                     All right.
                         THE COURT:
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        let me tell you, as long as your microphones
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        are on, meaning they have a green light on at
        counsel table, we will be catching you I hope.
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        And we'll see if those on the phone can hear.
 6
        So let's experiment.
 7
                         UNKNOWN SPEAKER: We can hear
 8
        perfectly, Your Honor.
                                     Well, I expect
 9
                         THE COURT:
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        that's right because Mr. Schutz came up to the
11
        main podium here. Now we're going to
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        experiment and see what happens with the
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        microphones at counsel table.
14
               Who is here on behalf of Experian
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        besides Mr. Milne?
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                         MR. PACE: Your Honor, this is
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        Jack Pace.
                    I will take full advantage of the
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        microphone today given my voice.
                                           From White &
19
        Case on behalf of Experian. Also with me in
20
        the courtroom is Chris Sullivan from the
21
        Lindquist & Vennum firm on behalf of Experian
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        as well as my partner, Christopher Glancy,
23
        also from White & Case on behalf of Experian.
24
                         THE COURT: All right. Did
25
        you have any trouble hearing, Mr. Pace?
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1	ND DAGE. Not of all
1	MR. PACE: Not at all.
2	THE COURT: All right. Good.
3	Then on behalf of Trans Union, I know we have
4	Mr. Gardner on the phone. Anyone else here in
5	the courtroom? Yes.
6	MR. MORRIS: Yes, Your Honor.
7	Here live is Chris Morris. And John Cullis
8	from the Neal, Gerber firm in Chicago is also
9	here.
10	THE COURT: All right. Okay.
11	And then anyone here on behalf of
12	VantageScore?
13	MS. MILLER: Good afternoon,
14	Your Honor. Justi Miller from Kelly and
15	Berens.
16	THE COURT: All right. And
17	then we have one of the motions involves a
18	third party, the Olson Company. And who is
19	here on behalf of them? If you say it, I will
20	speak for you and then when we do the motion,
21	I'll have you come up.
22	MR. JONES: Your Honor,
23	Matthew Jones (unintelligible).
24	THE COURT: All right.
25	Matthew Jones. All right. Let me share with

what I understand we need to be addressing this afternoon. There are actually three motions but two are basically the flip side of each other. One is the motion to compel by defendants against Olson and Company and the motion for protective order by Olson and Company having to do with a subpoena, third-party subpoena that was served on the Olson firm. The second major motion is defendants' motion to compel against plaintiffs.

I also understand that we have two informal issues to address. One is the privilege log issue that came up last week on the phone and I asked the parties to be prepared to talk today to me about what they're going to propose by way of either joint resolution or separate resolution for that matter. And then apparently there is an issue that came up with respect to a deposition that I think may be about to take place today or maybe not. But as I understand it, at least one of the parties wanted to raise it informally this morning. I wasn't here this morning so we couldn't do it then

and I agreed that I would hear it this afternoon, if both sides -- those parties to the dispute were willing to resolve that issue informally as well.

With respect to the deposition issue, the request that was communicated to me is if we're going to handle that one informally, we do so first because apparently that may bear on whether this deposition proceeds or under what circumstances and apparently it was scheduled to go forward today. So my suggestion is we address that issue first.

Then my intention was to address the motions surrounding the Olson subpoena so that we can get them out and on their way and they don't have to sit through the motion to compel. And then finally, the motion to compel by defendants. And then when we're done with that, we'll address the issue with respect to the privilege log.

So I don't know who made the phone call today about the deposition. Mr. Pace?

MR. PACE: Yes, Your Honor.

Jack Pace. It was one of my colleagues called the court this morning to raise this issue,

and it really does relate both to the deposition scheduled for today and I suppose has sort of larger scheduling implication of what happened this morning in terms of the deposition happening. So if I could and if Your Honor is willing to hear this issue first, I could briefly summarize the issue.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask, have you had an opportunity to confirm with plaintiff's counsel about this issue, number one. And number two, are they agreeable to resolving this issue informally over the phone as opposed to through formal motion practice?

MR. PACE: Well, Your Honor,
we've -- I guess we've put the request to the
plaintiffs to understand the basis for the
cancellation of the motion and how it could
get resolved and we haven't heard back in
fact. And I think, as Your Honor will find
out today, the -- it all relates to the filing
of counterclaims yesterday with the
defendants' answer and the issue -- even if
the issue -- let me put it this way. Even if
the issue doesn't involve the resolution of
the specific deposition that was scheduled for

today, we have a related scheduling type question for Your Honor because it affects depositions scheduled tomorrow and next week that we need to get resolved and is the reason for the two individuals on the phone and a number of the lawyers who are sitting in the back of the courtroom today.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Tietjen or Mr. Schutz, whoever would like to speak on behalf of plaintiffs, my question is are you willing to have the Court take on this issue informally so that we can get to the substance of it or no?

MR. SCHUTZ: You need to get away, Mr. Pace. You are sick.

Your Honor, the -- first, we are not willing to have it done informally.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHUTZ: But there's a bigger back story that I think you should have for 30 seconds here.

Last night, without any previous notice to us, without any previous notice to the Court, without submitting a draft of any kind or a motion, they filed a 78 paragraph, 22

page antitrust counterclaim in this case and given for a host of reasons that we're more than happy to get into at least informally so the Court has some idea of the impact that that has on the expert deposition discovery schedule which was to commence today and we've got depositions scheduled next week. More than happy to get into that as background information.

But we intend to move to strike that pleading and seek a protective order with regard to anywhere they intend to go with these expert depositions and that's why the expert deposition was canceled. We think that that's probably best left with some level of briefing so the Court can get the whole story.

THE COURT: Let me, again

trying to address the logistics here, if it is

not going to impact whatever happens in the

proceeding of the deposition this afternoon or

this expert deposition that was apparently

scheduled for today, then what I would like to

do is tee up this issue at least to get a

better sense of what the issue is at the end

of this formal motion so, again, we're not

holding up nonparties and then we'll talk about it then.

If there was something that was going to affect whether a deposition proceeded this afternoon or not and the parties were in agreement to getting that resolved so it could go forward, I'd hear it now but I think it makes more sense, even in light of

Mr. Schutz's comment that he's not willing to informally resolve the issue, I would like to get my heads up on what the issue is but I'd prefer to do it at the end of this hearing when we go into the informal conference.

MR. PACE: Yes, Your Honor.

If I just might very quickly because it does affect the schedule tomorrow.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. PACE: And the reason that -- and the lawyers who are on the phone and those who are in the back of the room who otherwise, depending on what we say right now, will go to the airport and catch flights. So if I could just briefly, just to respond to what Mr. Schutz said, you know, as -- and the reason why we called Your Honor this morning

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is because it really is of an extraordinary and unfortunate, in our view, development.

As you know, we're trying to pack in a very aggressive expert discovery schedule. believe it's something like 11 expert depositions over the course of a three-week The first one is scheduled to time period. take place today. Yesterday on the deadline for the defendants to file their answers to the plaintiff's amended complaint, Trans Union and Experian filed answers with counterclaims and got a cryptic message from the plaintiffs last night, and I have copies I can provide to you, saying it's seemingly almost as punishment for the counterclaim that we received your counterclaim and the deposition scheduled for tomorrow and the deposition scheduled for Saturday are not taking place.

Now, the counterclaims are nothing to do with the deposition today and the deposition that everyone traveled here for on Saturday. We have lawyers already in Minneapolis who have incurred flight costs and hotel costs for those depositions and they have nothing to do with the counterclaims that

were filed. We promptly e-mailed the plaintiffs and said what's the basis for this, you know, abrupt cancellation. It has nothing to do with the counterclaims. We didn't get an answer.

We showed up at the Robins Kaplan law firm this morning for the deposition and were stopped at the door and told the deposition isn't taking place, go. We asked what's the basis? It has nothing to do with the counterclaim. It was Mr. Laris from the Robins firm who answered and said -- wouldn't answer. He simply said the deposition is not taking place. We then asked is the witness present so that we can find out if we get a resolution from the judge today should we stay in town so we can start the deposition this afternoon. He walked away and didn't even answer us.

And so we're left with the situation that the plaintiffs didn't seek a protective order last night or this morning to stop the deposition. They just seemingly, as punishment for us filing these unrelated counterclaims, sought — basically had

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self-help. They just canceled the deposition and stopped us at the door and now we incurred obviously the flight cost, the hotel cost, the court reporter fees, et cetera.

And so our main two issues for Your Honor, and we can resolve them whenever is agreeable to everybody, are, number one, we incurred those costs. The plaintiffs didn't seek a protective order and that was the background and we will be seeking our costs associated with coming out here to the deposition and all the lawyers who did. number two, we have depositions scheduled tomorrow and next week. We have lawyers who are heading out to San Francisco for depositions next week and then others in Chicago next week, two in California and two in Chicago. So we need to know what happens In other words, we don't think because of the filing of the counterclaims that plaintiffs can unilaterally halt all proceedings in the lawsuit which seems to be what's happening.

And so that's the reason for what we think was sort of a pretty emergency request

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        this morning and this afternoon, Your Honor.
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                                     Okay. Where are
                         THE COURT:
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        the -- today the deposition of the expert
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        apparently isn't going forward. Individuals
        flew in for that, I understand.
 5
                                         You talked
 6
        about that there are lawyers who are about to
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        get on planes today for depositions tomorrow?
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                         MR. PACE:
                                    No, Your Honor.
 9
        The deposition tomorrow is also supposed to
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        take place in Minneapolis and they're here.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     And the lawyers
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        are here?
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                         MR. PACE:
                                    Yes.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     All right.
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        and -- so they're not -- we don't need to
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        decide this issue immediately as it relates to
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        today and tomorrow in the next hour or so in
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        terms of how it affects people's plane plans,
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        other than if they're not taking depositions,
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        I assume they'd like to go home today and not
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        tomorrow.
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                         MR. PACE: We don't know if
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        the witness of today is here. Like I said,
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        the plaintiffs didn't tell us, but we were
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informed it was unilaterally canceled so I

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suppose you're right, there was nothing going on this afternoon.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what I want to do, then, on this issue. want to address the Olson motion first because, as I said, we got third parties here, sitting here. Their motion is actually the first one that was scheduled for today and I want to address their motion. Then when we're done with that, I want to hear what's going on for today tomorrow even though, and I understand there are larger issues here, and Mr. Schutz you've indicated that you wish to have this resolved by motion practice, but I want to hear more about your response to that but I want to do that after we've at least let those who are parties to this lawsuit go and then we'll get into the motions to compel and the balance of the issue related to the privilege log.

So let's do this, then. We have a motion to compel and then a companion motion for a protective order by the Olson group.

I'd like to -- who will be arguing on behalf of the defendants on the motion to compel?

MR. JONES: I will, Your

2 Honor.

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THE COURT: It will be

Mr. Jones, is that correct, on behalf of

Olson? And I'm assuming both motions could be handled together. They seem to be the flip side of each other. All right.

I want to let you know just because I am going to control the amount of time that we're expending on all of these matters, with respect to your motion, I'm going to allot a total of a half hour in total on this, 15 minutes per side, to address the issue with respect to the subpoena. Do not feel like you need to use all your time. That would be fine too. I've read all the papers on both sides, the reply that was filed by defendants, and the cases that were cited by both sides. I'm very familiar as to what's going on. My law clerk is going to attempt to use the timers here.

And so who's -- Mr. Pace, is that you?

Apparently down on your podium there, once

Steve gets it started, you're going to see

presumably a green light and then you're going

to see a yellow light.

2 MR. GARDNER: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, this is Jim Gardner. If it's easier for the Court, Mr. Milne and I don't need to be on the phone -- I'm speaking for Mr. Milne but I think this is right -- for any of the motions that were scheduled for today.

THE COURT: Then we could -
if you were to call my chambers and talk to

Tara Craft who's the person who transferred

you in here, then we could call you when we're

ready to get to what I assume you want to be

involved in which is this issue regarding the

depositions.

MR. GARDNER: Yeah, that's correct. And everybody doesn't have to go through all of the microphone stuff for our benefit. So if it's okay with you, we will hang up now and then do you want us to -- how do you want to do this? Do you want us to call Tara Craft in your chambers and ask her just to give one of us a call --

THE COURT:

Yes.

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                         MR. GARDNER: -- when we're
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        ready and then I'll connect the other one on?
                         THE COURT:
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                                     That would be
        fine.
               That would be good. So if you call our
        main chambers number, the 1190, Tara will
 5
 6
        presumably answer the phone and you can give
 7
        her the number where she should call.
 8
                         MR. GARDNER:
                                       Okay. Good.
                                                      Ι
 9
        think that will work out better for everybody.
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                         THE COURT: Just so you know,
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        I'm estimating, based on the amount of time
12
        that I'm allotting for this motion and the
13
        other motion to compel, that it will probably
        be about an hour and a half before we call you
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15
        back.
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                         MR. GARDNER: Okay. Thank you
17
        very much.
18
                         THE COURT:
                                     All right.
19
        you.
20
                         MR. GARDNER:
                                       Bye.
21
                         THE COURT:
                                     I assume Mr. Milne
22
        was agreeable to that because he just got hung
23
        up on.
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                         MR. PACE:
                                   It plays out
25
        exactly that way very often, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: All right. Do you see somewhere there on the podium there should be a green light or -- it's up there. All right. Then do you want to -- will there be a yellow light?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: A yellow (unintelligible).

THE COURT: So if you want to reserve time, then, and quit earlier, that's fine too.

MR. PACE: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. just ask a quick question. I"m using up some of your time but here is my question for you as it related to this motion with respect to The issue is compensation, whether they should be compensated or not. Initially the defendants took the position that all they should be compensated for was copying costs and basically the printing and copying costs. In the reply defendants said no, we're agreeable to pay reasonable, actual costs. And the focus clearly both in your initial moving papers but in the reply was on the fact that they're trying to charge you consulting

fees and 100 or \$125 an hour for things that appear to be -- certainly some of the events seem very clerical and wouldn't necessarily require someone at 100 or \$125 an hour to do them.

So my question to you is are the defendants now prepared to pay reasonable actual costs for Olson's review, retrieval, inspection, and production or are you still talking about that the only cost you think you should have to incur are the copying and printing costs?

MR. PACE: The answer to the first question is yes, Your Honor, but we interpret --

THE COURT: Yes -- you better tell me what my first question is because I asked multiple questions.

MR. PACE: Are we willing to pay reasonable, actual costs and we interpret reasonable to mean the way we define them in the papers. And Your Honor pointed to the two different ways it was put in our opening brief and our reply brief and I can clarify it was not meant to be a difference. Our position is

1 that whatever the actual costs are that Olson 2 will have to act to spend and by that we would 3 include printing, copying, if there are data 4 retrieval costs, for example, if information is stored on a backup tape, sometimes that 5 6 needs to be restored and that costs something. 7 You have to get a consultant to do it. 8 Whatever, you know, the data let's say costs, 9 whatever those hard actual costs are, we --10 the defendants are willing to pay. To the 11 extent --12 Well, let me -- go THE COURT: 13 ahead. 14 MR. PACE: I'm sorry, Your 15 To the extent that Olson is seeking us 16 to pay anything above that that would include 17 the hourly rates, the standard hourly rates, 18 however discounted slightly for 19 their employees, that their employees would 20 effectively charge their clients to spend time 21 moving around and finding documents and 22 complying with the subpoena, we are not 23 willing at this time to pay those costs. 24 believe that the obligation to pay costs comes

up only if the costs are significant.

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don't think these costs are significant under the rules and we think that we're required to, when we lived up to this obligation, to take reasonable steps to minimize the burden.

THE COURT: All right. make sure I'm being explicit when I talk about what you're willing to pay for. You did talk about data retrieval apart and in addition to copying and printing. Let's assume that as part of the retrieval and review process they need to use a lawyer to look through the documents to make sure that they are responsive to the subpoena, make sure that they are relevant, make sure that they are not privileged, for example. In your response when you say you're willing to pay reasonable costs, would that include reasonable attorney's fees, for example, in the review process or review for -- or maybe they need to mark it confidential, something like that where a lawyer or some outsider gets involved? MR. PACE: The answer is no,

it wouldn't include that, Your Honor,
primarily because that hasn't been part of the
discussions at all to date. I mean, the

proposal from Olson was that the costs that
they would incur would be essentially the
revenue they wouldn't be able to collect
because their employees, not hiring a lawyer
to look at documents or anything else, but
they would be their employee time to go and
spend time gathering documents and identifying
them.

THE COURT: And this would be employee time. Let's assume you're right, that they're going to use in-house people.

It's employee time, not lawyer time. And these presumably are employee time that would be revenue generating if they were doing something other than answering your subpoena. You're saying you shouldn't be obligated to pay any portion of that even the underlying costs without a mark up for profit. Is that what you're saying?

MR. PACE: Yes, Your Honor.

We don't believe that the position taken by

Olson up to this point was with the exception

of their request for attorney's fees in

connection with that motion.

THE COURT: Right. Separate

from that.

MR. PACE: Separate from that has been at the time of issue here, the part we're disputing is the time that their attorney — their employees would need to spend identifying responsive documents, that time which their employees couldn't spend doing other presumably revenue generating things. It's our position that that is not covered. That's not provided for by the rules and we do not need to cover those expenses if they are not significant expenses. And we think in light of the case law that they're not significant.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PACE: And that generally does summarize our position, Your Honor. The two primary issues are, in our view, are the costs significant and — because it's only if they're significant under the rules and the case law that we would be required to reimburse them for those costs and we think here they are not in light of the cases that we cite and they cite. And particularly because of the fact that this is not a

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situation like pretty much every case that's been cited where we have an overbroad subpoena or anything like that. Here we've taken many, several steps to adequately limit the scope of the subpoena by time, custodian and subject matter.

And the second issue is whether they're entitled to attorney's fees. And I think the cases, particularly the cases that they cite, the Green Tree case which Judge Erickson is very clear that even in that case attorney's fees are provided for if there's some type of breach of responsibility for a party to take reasonable steps to minimize the burden of the subpoena or the word misuse is used in the practice commentary that they cite. there's some type of misuse of the subpoena power, if that happens, then you may be entitled, the third party may be entitled to attorney's fees. And that is clearly -there's nothing in the record that shows anything like that, particularly in light of our efforts to narrow these requests.

A few words briefly on the responses from Olson to our motion and their affirmative

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motion for protective order. The only case they cite that comes anywhere close to this amount of money being determined as sufficiently significant to be -- to require a cost shifting to the subpoenaing party is the Williams v. Dallas case cited in their -- in a few places but in particular in their opposition to our brief. And I think in that case the costs were about -- it was ten years ago but the costs were about \$10,000 or \$9,000 similar to the costs here I think. But there were few very significant differences in that That was the case about the NFL player, case. just things going on in the courthouse today --

THE COURT: I had to look to see if it was the same one. Apparently so.

MR. PACE: And I think Eric
Williams was the Cowboys lineman there who was
suing a number of entities and on its -- he
subpoenaed a number of lawyers who represented
parties for the other side and the court went
out of its way to mention up front and
throughout the opinion that the subpoena
was -- the words it used were overbroad on its

face and deposition and documents from two individuals. And in light of the overbreadth of the subpoena and what it would cost these two individual lawyers, they determined that 9 or \$10,000 in expenses was significant, sufficiently significant that they shouldn't have to pay those costs and order the subpoenaing party to bear those costs.

Here we think that's significantly different than the situation here. We're not obviously talking about two individuals. We cited briefly I realize but briefly some material in our opening brief about Olson as a company and \$170 million in revenue recently. And certainly they're more capable of covering the cost than the two individuals were in the Williams case.

And in addition, another factor that
the court relied on in Williams was, again, it
goes to was there a misuse of the subpoena
power. How overbroad, how overreaching was
the subpoenaing party being. There the
court -- the subpoena there specifically
sought and Williams went after privileged
documents. I mean that was one of the reasons

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they went after attorneys. He was asking specifically for privilege documents. And the court, perhaps offended by that or not, factored into that the decision about whether cost shifting was appropriate.

And then very briefly, Your Honor, Olson also relies on three orders from -three unpublished orders from this court. Different judges in the District of Minnesota in support of their opinion. And just briefly on those, the Green Tree decision which they talk about the most from Judge Erickson, again similar to the points I made above. You know, in setting up the decision on page 2, Judge Erickson said, according -- you know, while KPMG contends that the subpoena is overly broad and that owing to that overbreadth, the plaintiff should reimburse KPMG for its costs. In other words, it's in part a function of exactly how reasonable has the subpoenaing party been in trying to narrow -- in seeking documents in the first place and seeking to narrow the burden on the third party. that's clearly a different situation from what we have here. I think we put this in our

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reply brief that in KPMG there were at least 53 document requests being interpreted broadly. Here we have one and we've limited it to -- we've limited the time period dramatically.

We've taken a guess, it's imperfect, but we took the people who we knew from Olson who we thought worked on the project, we gave the names to Olson and said if this looks right to you, search these nine people's files for this one project, the Fair Isaac project, which, by the way, is probably why they don't need lawyers to review the documents because our request is simply who worked on the Fair Isaac project relating to VantageScore, identify those documents. There may be a privilege review or something but I'm not And that's what you produce. significantly different than the cases cited by the plaintiff. Judge Erickson goes through the Rule 45(C)(1) analysis in his opinion in a way that I think is very relevant. He cites 45 -- Rule 45(C)(1) and specifically says that subpoenaing party shall take reasonable steps to avoid imposing due burden and that if the

court on behalf of which the subpoena issued shall enforce this duty and impose upon the party or attorney in breach of this duty, so it has to be — there must be a breach of the duty of being reasonable to trigger the responsibility to pay expenses in the first place. And that's not what we have here.

And the Court goes on to cite the language from the rule that says such an order to compel production shall protect any person who is not a party or an officer of the party from significant expense. Again, this whole analysis is triggered only if the court determines that the expenses are significant.

And finally, on Green Tree, the court in Green Tree also mentioned that the revision to Rule 45 did not change the prior rule that still exists. And this is on page 6 of the court's decision under which a nonparty still, even in light of Rule 45(C)(1) and the change in the protections incorporated therein and which a nonparty can still be required to bear some or all of its expenses where the equities of a particular case demand it.

And so if that's the case, then, Your

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Honor still -- then they still may be entitled
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        to -- they still may be required to pay all of
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        their expenses and yet we're offering to pay
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        the reasonable actual expenses limited to
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        copying, printing, and data costs.
               The same issue -- I won't go into
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        detail. I know my time is short but the same
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        issue is --
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                         THE COURT:
                                     If you want time
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        to respond, you may -- I see you're already
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        into your four minutes. You may choose to --
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        I have read these cases extensively so you may
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        want to hear from Mr. Jones and then use the
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        time in rebuttal.
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                         MR. PACE: Okay, Your Honor.
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        The only other thing I'll note just quickly,
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        then, is that with respect to -- it's similar
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        with respect to request for attorney's fees
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        and the Linder factors but I guess I'll use my
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        last couple minutes in reply.
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                         THE COURT: All right.
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                         MR. PACE:
                                    Thank you, Your
23
        Honor.
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                         THE COURT: All right.
                                                  Thank
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              Mr. Jones.
        you.
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MR. JONES: Thank you, Your

2 Honor.

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THE COURT: While Mr. Cottris is setting you up here on the time, let me tell you the question that I have for you which is you lay out an itemization of what your client estimates to be hours associated with various parts of this search and retrieval and production but it doesn't appear to me that it would be appropriate even if I were to grant some relief, that I would be ordering them to pay 100 or \$125 for at least some components of this production which clearly appear to me to be clerical in nature whether it be making copies or printing. is something one of our interns could be doing. So I want to make sure you're addressing for me what it is -- how they set -- I want to understand how they set 100 and 125 an hour.

MR. JONES: I can address that simply, Your Honor. I agree that standing in front of a copying machine making copies, you shouldn't get paid \$100 an hour to make copies. We estimated the general amount of

time that we thought we could undertake the task that was being asked of us. And a significant amount of that time is spent trying to make sure that we identify actual relevant documents, you know, through -- and retrieve housed data documents and not involving actual spending time copying the documents.

All we ask for is to be reimbursed for the time that we spent trying to comply with their subpoena. We didn't ask for an exorbitant amount of money. We didn't ask for, you know, crazy amount of hours. But it does take a significant amount of time to do the work that they're asking us to do.

THE COURT: Who is going -when you say it's going to take a significant
amount of time for us to do the work, who is
going to be doing the work?

 $\label{eq:mr.jones:employees} \mbox{MR. JONES: Employees of Olson}$  will be doing the work.

THE COURT: All right. So they're going to be the ones who are going to look at the subpoena and go make the effort to retrieve the information sought by the

subpoena and review what's pulled up and decide if it's responsive to the subpoena and they will be the ones doing the copying or printing and production and lawyers will not be involved?

MR. JONES: We have not been charged with any task in making sure that the documents comply with the subpoena.

THE COURT: And where does the 100 or a hundred and a quarter per hour come from? Where is that -- what's the basis of that figure?

MR. JONES: Olson has a wide range of fees that they charge for tasks. The low end of what Olson charges is between 100 and \$125 an hour. This is, you know, bargain rate.

THE COURT: What would they normally be charging someone -- what kind of services would they be performing in their regular ordinary course of business for 100 or a hundred and a quarter an hour?

MR. JONES: Basically it would be comparative to what the particular project was being asked to do. If the task is

recreating, you know, documents and data that's on a file, you know, computer people that, you know, work in-house for Olson to do that or, you know, people that are low end account people that can review various documents to make sure that they are related to the actual Fair Isaac project. It's -- we're not going to take John Olson of Olson and company and his rate and have him review the documents. That's not --

THE COURT: I bet he wouldn't agree to.

MR. JONES: Probably wouldn't.

And so we tried to, you know, we tried to

limit the amount of money. We tried to

resolve it.

And basically from my understanding that the project -- this is just -- Olson was never actually employed by Fair Isaac. There was a request for proposal or an RFP where Olson went up and they said can you put something together for us. We put something together for us and we were never hired. That proposal that was created was actually -- has already been provided to the defendant. Now

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defendants want to go on a fishing expedition to determine what maybe was said between Olson internally in creating this project, I don't They're entitled to go on their fishing expedition. We don't care. We're not arguing that it's irrelevant. We're not making -saying that there's not a responsibility to provide this document -- these documents to But it's not -- I don't believe that the rules are set up for us to subsidize their fishing expedition. I think that's the point of Rule 45. And the changes of Rule 45 are simply that, that it, you know, pay for what you want and we'll give it to you. THE COURT: Let me ask a I assume the hourly rates that question. Olson charges for these types of individuals to perform these types of duties have built in some sort of profit margin. MR. JONES: I'm sure that they

MR. JONES: I'm sure that they have some. I don't have any idea what those are or what they would be.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: And I have not asked for that material. There's a couple

CASE 0:06-cv-04112-ADM -JSM Document 607 Filed 02/12/09 Page 41 of 150 1 comments that were made by Mr. Pace that I'd 2 like to address. 3 THE COURT: Certainly. 4 MR. JONES: Quickly. One, he made a comment about Olson has \$175 million in 5 revenue and that's false. Olson has had -- if 6 7 he knows anything about the advertising 8 business, Olson has \$175 million in billings.

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he knows anything about the advertising
business, Olson has \$175 million in billings.
And what that means simply is that companies
that Olson created the advertising for spent
that much money on advertising. They paid it
to NBC or CBS or print. Olson doesn't -that's not their revenue. That's billings and
that's a much different thing than a
\$2 billion corporation versus something very
significantly less than, you know,
\$10 million. And so I think that's

Second, he's made --

inaccurate.

THE COURT: Are you prepared to share with the Court what Olson's revenues indeed are if their 170 million number isn't correct?

MR. JONES: Today I am not prepared to share that number with the Court

because I don't know it.

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THE COURT: All right.

Second, he made --MR. JONES: he stated the reasonable steps that the defendants took to limit the subpoena. limitations are illusory limitations. your scope of the documents to the time that you worked on the project versus infinity. Limit the amount of -- limit your production of documents for people who -- to people who worked on the project as opposed to infinity. I mean, that's not a real limitation. limiting, you know, data retrieval, you know, there are real limitations to complying with the subpoena. None of them were made by defendants in this case. I mean, it's just not true that there was any meaningful limitation to any of the requests that was made.

All we want is simply to be reimbursed at a reasonable amount for the time that we spent. And reasonable is something more than the cost, the hard costs for creating a printed piece of paper. There is time that is spent and required and I think it's only fair

and only reasonable in a case where we're not involved in the litigation. We're not employed by Fair Isaac. We're not continuing to work for Fair Isaac. We have no interest at all in what happens in this litigation to be reimbursed for a reasonable time and reasonable costs for producing those documents. Now, that's all we ask for.

We even voluntarily offered to decrease the amount that we would be charging them by 25 percent which was, you know -- which offer was blown off by defendants. And they said we'll pay you for your copying costs. Well, what -- I mean, we're going to have to spend 100 hours of time to complete this project and defendants say, well, that's not significant, \$12,000 is not significant amount of costs.

Well, I think that \$12,000 is significant. My client thinks that \$12,000 is significant.

There's no equitable reason for us to be involved in this case that would justify us paying any of those costs.

I just simply wish the Court to issue an order saying that we should get paid reasonable time that we -- for the reasonable

1 time that we spend going for, looking through 2 the documents, retrieving the documents and 3 providing those documents to the defendants. 4 Should we get paid by the hour at \$100 for 5 standing in front of a copying machine making 6 copies? No. And I simply ask that the Court 7 allow Olson its costs more than just the 8 copying cost for complying with the subpoena. 9 THE COURT: Okav. Thank you 10 very much. Mr. Pace, anything further? 11 MR. PACE: Yes, Your Honor. 12 Very briefly. With respect to -- just to 13 clarify the record. With respect to the 14 limitations imposed or offered by the 15 defendants in Olson's compliance with the 16 subpoena, I mean, we certainly didn't mean 17 them to be illusory. I mean, by limiting the 18 time period we were clarifying it to the 19 specific time period of the life of 20 VantageScore after March of 2006. And to the 21 extent -- because our initial subpoena was 22 broader than that, if that didn't have any

documents in Olson's possession, this is the

But we did limit

affect on the -- on the actual scope of

first we're hearing of it.

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the time period. We did limit the topics of the subpoena. It's one request. significantly we limited the custodians. mean, we made very clear that while on the one hand a discovery request in litigation generally and a subpoena would call for a search throughout, you know, potentially throughout a company, we made clear that we would be more than happy to have an identification of the handful of employees who actually worked on the project so we don't have to get into some type of broad searching of e-mail files or central files. Identify who worked on the project and we'll agree with We'll take your word for it and you can search those individuals' files.

In response to the general point
about -- which, again, is sort of the first
we're hearing of this, that oh, you really
shouldn't worry about this problem generally
because we actually weren't really hired. We
didn't really do anything. There were
recommendations in several of the documents
and work done that are attached to our opening
motion, recommendations made by Olson which we

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know were acted upon and are part of the Fair Isaac strategy in advertising tactics in this case which are central issues in the case. And whether or not that was all sort of part of some informal relationship such that there was never a contract, I don't know, but we identified documents that we've seen that have actual recommendations that relate to key issues in the case that we think are relevant. And I guess that's probably supported, if it takes -- if it's going to take them a hundred hours to sort of search for this stuff, that would seem to suggest there might be something I quess Mr. Jones did also confirm out there. that the rates that he was quoting were the rates charged to clients with a profit margin and that's what we've been saying all along.

And finally, we haven't really focused on it but I just want to say for the record that the request for attorney's fees for the briefing, for anything else, you know, is really extraordinary and just something should be said about it. There -- you know, as I said briefly at the beginning, attorney's fees can be called for if a party breaches its

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And Judge Erickson put it very well, breaches its obligation to be reasonable and doesn't narrow its request, misuses a The cases say that. Olson's subpoena. opposition to our motion makes clear their basis for their fee request. It's at page 8 of their brief, the second half of that paragraph. Defendants have refused any attempt at compromise. The record rebuts that directly but I'll go on. Refused any attempt to compromise and have forced Olson to bring a motion for protective order, I'm not sure about that, and respond to this motion to compel. Because of defendants intransigence, Olson should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs. In other words, their whole basis for their fee request is that we -- they think we're wrong, I guess, and we disagree with them and we think that's certainly not provided for by Rule 45.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. PACE: Thank you.

MR. JONES: May I respond

25 to --

1 THE COURT: Yes.

2 MR. JONES: -- something

Mr. Pace said?

4 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JONES: Mr. Pace just made a comment which I found extraordinary. He said that it was the first time that he's ever heard that their limitations wouldn't have anything to do with limiting the scope of responding to the subpoena. If you look at Exhibit F to our initial motion, it's an e-mail to Bryan Gant of his law firm and Mr. Pace where it actually says, as I have -- as -- they've informed me, as I suspected, that the definition you furnished does not appear to limit the scope or the search that they will have to make. What he just said was not true.

And as far as our request for attorney's fees goes, there just seems to be a pattern and practice from the defendant of offering something that is nothing and saying that it's reasonable and forcing these issues to a head which seems like in -- where normal people should be able to respond and work them

out. We're forced to come and deal with this issue because defendant would not respond to our, you know, I think pretty simple request to be, you know, reimbursed for the time we spent on this in responding to the subpoena.

So I think that there is a breach of the subpoena power and there's a bully aspect to the subpoena power being used by the defendants and bully aspect to the litigation process that's being used, and I do think those are the significant reasons to be awarded attorney's fees.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to issue my order here from the bench.

It will be followed up in a written order.

I'm going to be -- I suppose what I would say is granting each motion in part and denying each motion in part.

So the decision is this. I do find that the expenses that this subpoena on Olson will cause them to incur significant expenses and that these are expenses that should be reimbursed by the defendants. And so my decision is that the defendants will bear the costs of the production of what they refer to

as their limited subpoena for costs associated and that the Olson firm will incur for retrieval, identification, review and production of documents which are responsive to the limited subpoena.

not only retrieval, that is computerized retrieval but people involved in the retrieval, the actual review of the documents by individuals at Olson to make sure that those documents are responsive to the subpoena. It will involve their production and collating, printing those costs as well.

So it will include, just so I'm clear, not only the hard costs as defendants refer to it but the time associated with this process that Olson will incur that they would otherwise be incurring on revenue generating activities.

Having said that, as part of the decision for reasonable rate, the hourly rate that Olson will be permitted to submit as reasonable costs will not include a profit margin. And so, Mr. Jones, you will need to explore with your client but I'm talking about

the basic costs and not the additional profit margin that they would otherwise be charging to their clients. I will not set an amount in advance or a fixed amount that the Olson firm is going to incur basically because I don't think I have adequate information to do that. I recognize the rules would permit it but I really find at this point that while I appreciate the effort thus far that the Olson firm is trying to estimate the time it will take them, I find it more in the form of a guesstimate than a really good estimate. And so I'm not going to fix a particular amount.

I am going to do what Magistrate Judge Erickson did in his case and that is require that after Olson retrieves and produces the information, that they submit a bill to defendants with an itemization of their hours, their costs without profit, and the services that they -- a description of the services associated with those hours and costs to defendants. If defendants, after reviewing that bill, determine that they believe it's reasonable, then they'll pay it. If they believe it's not reasonable or any portion of

it isn't reasonable, then the parties will confer to try and resolve the dispute. And is you can't resolve the dispute, then,

Mr. Jones, you'll bring the matter to my attention and I will resolve what is a reasonable amount of reimbursement to your client. You can submit that in the form of a formal motion or it can also be submitted by the parties through letter submissions to the court with attachments so as to encourage the parties to spend any more time or attorney's fees on resolving this issue of what's reasonable.

I am not going to award any attorney's fees to the Olson firm for bringing their motion for a protective order or defending the defendants' motion. Here the defendants offered some relief, obviously not the relief that the Jones firm wanted. I don't find it's adequate and I am giving them what I do think is adequate but they did offer some relief.

And I also find, to be honest, that the Olson firm or response that we're entitled to 100 or \$125 an hour for items that clearly no one is going to be billing that kind of time

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for copying, printing, a lot of those issues could have been resolved without having to bring that matter to the court, so I'm not going to award attorney's fees to the Jones firm for bringing their motion for a protective order or defending the defendants' motion.

Just so I'm clear, the basis of this is under Rule 45(C)(2)(b). That rule provides that the third party cannot be made to bear significant expenses. I find that this amount of time that the Jones firm is being asked to incur is significant. I recognize that the advisory comments and cases suggest that sometimes the producing party can be asked to bear some of the expense or all of the expense, but I think the Exxon Valdez case is clear is that you can ask the party to do so if the equities would suggest that it would be more fair to ask the producing party who's not a party to the litigation to bear some or all of those expenses. And I don't find any of those factors to be present here that are articulated in the Valdez case or the Linders case that picks that up as well. The Olson

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firm is a nonparty. It doesn't have any interest in this litigation or the outcome of the litigation. This isn't a situation where they can better accommodate the cost than the defendants whether they're a multi-million dollar company or a multi-billion dollar It's clear to me both sides can company. certainly bear the expense. That's not going to be a driving force. And while I'm sure the parties think this litigation is of public importance, I don't think that this was the driving issue, that that is an issue that will resolve this matter. So I don't find any of the equities present to ask the Olson firm to pick up the costs of the subpoena.

Again, the rules do allow me to set a set amount or fixed amount in advance. I don't find that that would be appropriate here and I don't find that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate in this situation. So for all of those reasons, I am granting your respective motions in part and denying them in part. And as I said, I'll be issuing an order consistent with this ruling.

That said, Mr. Jones, do you want to

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come up to the podium. Can you share with us
when -- how soon your client can respond to
the subpoena?

MR. JONES: I don't have a very good answer. We estimated it would take us two to three weeks when we initially got the subpoena. I assume that's still true. The only concern I have right now is we have two holidays that are showing up and holidays that are Wednesday and Thursday. Most people are having those Fridays off as well during that time period. So two to three weeks is probably still accurate. I don't know if this two to three weeks is probably the best -- the best two to three weeks to make that -- you know, the middle of January is probably, you know, is probably enough time to get the documents together.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Pace, any comment on the timing of that?

MR. PACE: No, Your Honor.

22 (unintelligible) provide, of course, Your

23 | Honor's schedule. We have a deadline of

January 5 for hearing dates on nondispositive

25 motions and while I, hearing everything I've

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        heard today, certainly don't expect any future
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        disputes with respect to this production, if,
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        as a technical matter, if it comes in after
        January 5, of course, if there are follow-up
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        issues required, then --
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                         THE COURT: You can bring them
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        to my attention. And obviously, I would
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        expect the bill would come with the production
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        and that if there are issues, that would be
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        probably after the date as well and I would
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        certainly entertain that issue at that time.
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               Well, I'm going to order, then -- today
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        is the 5th of December so I'm going to order
        that they -- let's see. Do you have the
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        calendars?
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                        MR. JONES:
                                     I have a calendar,
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        Your Honor.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     Good.
                                            I'm glad
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        you do. What's that -- the Monday around like
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        the 8th of January, somewhere there?
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                        MR. JONES:
                                     The 8th is a
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        Thursday. The 12th is a Monday.
                         THE COURT: All right.
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        do the 9th of January, then, so that gives
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        your client basically a little over a month
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taking into account the holidays here.

Obviously, if they can get it done sooner, I

would encourage them to do so because a lot

of -- there's a lot of things that are

happening with these parties. The sooner it

gets in their hands, the sooner they'll know

what they need to do with it.

MR. JONES: I appreciate that
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MR. JONES: I appreciate that,
Your Honor. And just to be clear, do you want
me to send those documents to you Mr. Pace or
to local counsel?

MR. PACE: You can send them to local counsel.

MR. JONES: Okay. Great.

15 Thanks.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Actually, I think that what I had said may have been inaccurate. When we had Mr. Gardner and Mr. Milne on the phone, I think I said that we would do this in an hour and a half and I think I was thinking I would do the defendants' motion next as opposed to the informal issue with respect to the depositions. But I'm still not hearing that it will affect anything that happens today.

It's really what happens tomorrow. So let's go forward and hear the defendants' motion to compel.

Let me share with you how I want to address the timing of this issue and how I actually want to approach generally hearing the motion. What I want to do is, my intention is to have each document request or group that belongs grouped together addressed first by defendants, then by plaintiffs. So, for example, first we're going to address document request No. 8 out of the seven set of document requests. I'm going to hear defendants on it, plaintiffs until we're done hearing about that. I'm going to hopefully rule at that time.

We're going to go on to, then, document request 11, 30, 35 of the seventh set of document requests. Then we'll move to the ninth set and I will -- I'm going to address document request 1 to 3 as one group, document request 10 to 12 as the second group, and document request 5 to 7 as a third group where I'll hear both sides and then hopefully be able to issue an order at the conclusion of

hearing argument with respect to those document requests.

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Again, I want to control the amount of time that gets spent on this because I want to encourage you to focus on issues that are not in your papers. I've read them. I've read your exhibits, and so I may have questions for you. But in other words, I don't want you to spend your time repeating what you've already written to me.

So for document request 8 and 11 and 30 I'm going to let you each spend five minutes a piece on those document requests. respect to document request 35 of the seventh set and then the last three sets, categories of document requests of the ninth set, I'm going to allow you to spend ten minutes on each side for each one of those document requests. So document request 1 to 3 of the ninth set defendants get ten minutes, plaintiff gets ten minutes. Same with document request 10 through 12 and document request 5 through 7 having to do with the Blaze Advisor. So Steve will be keeping track here.

1 Why don't we start, then, with document 2 request No. 8. Who will be arguing on behalf 3 of defendants? Well, you sure got the short 4 end of the stick, Mr. Pace. 5 MR. PACE: I'm losing my 6 voice. 7 Yeah, right. THE COURT: 8 MR. PACE: Your Honor, if I 9 might suggest, you know, one possibility. 10 way -- and this might be evident or this might 11 be hinted at by some of the briefs, a couple of the issues have been sufficiently narrowed 12 13 that the amount of time that I likely would spend -- I can't speak for the plaintiff -- on 14 15 some of these issues would be, you know, like 16 on request No. 8, may literally be a minute 17 and request 11. And so, for example --18 THE COURT: I was trying to be

generous by telling you you had five minutes. So I think that the issues have been teed up for me but I wanted to give both sides an opportunity to add anything if they wanted to.

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MR. PACE: Absolutely. And I guess all I'm possibly proposing is that potentially if -- I mean, I could group 8, 11 and 30 together.

with plaintiffs.

2 THE COURT: That would be

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MR. PACE: This way we don't have to get up three times, if that's okay

MR. COLLYARD: That's fine,

8 Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PACE: Okay. Your Honor, as you saw, the parties spent a lot of time in the correspondence, the e-mails, the briefs pointing fingers at each other and identifying who was right and who should have been withdrawing their motion or produced documents earlier. I won't do that here. I think you have the whole record. And I'm sure you enjoy it even less than we do reading this stuff.

What are the opening issues. The open issues, each request that we're going to talk about today does have -- does still have some open issue even if it's been substantially narrowed by the requests. For example, even if a particular agreement has been reached after a motion to compel has been filed, what

we're talking about is potentially something as simple as having the plaintiff identify where the responsive documents were because we didn't see them in the first place and maybe they're there.

The first one is request No. 8. These are the documents that relate to the relationship with the Magnum firm. And very simply, Your Honor, as papers make clear, prior to the motion, we simply had one difference of position. The plaintiffs were --

THE COURT: Okay. And they said they produced it and now the issue is you're saying you can't find it and will they identify the Bates number, correct?

MR. PACE: Yeah. And it relates, just so the record is clear, a particular category of documents, prior to the motion, the plaintiffs were agreeing to produce documents relating to, and I hope this isn't an -- this is what we were basing it on. They were saying they would produce documents relating to the decision to hire or the decision to do with Magnum and they left out

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        and would not agree to produce, before our
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        motion, the documents relating to the plans
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        and strategies for actually going forward.
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        That was the disconnect.
                                   That appears now to
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        have been resolved. And so our only open
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        issue is either they should, you know, be --
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        they should produce it or if they've already
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        produced it, they just identify those
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        documents.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     All right.
                                                 So I'm
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        clear, the only issue you're not confident
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        that they've produced is the planning
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        documents. You want to know have they
        produced them. If so, you're saying you can't
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        find them so give us the Bates number or order
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        them to produce them.
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                        MR. PACE: Correct, Your
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        Honor.
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                                     All right.
                         THE COURT:
                                                 I
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        understand that issue. Let's go to No. 11.
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                        MR. PACE: No. 11 is the
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        document that relates to special pricing.
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        in other words, diversions from standard
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        pricing. And the only open issue prior to the
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        filing of our motion was what happens before
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2003. After 2003, the plaintiffs represented that every special pricing request was memorialized in a spreadsheet that they were producing to us and that was satisfactory to us. And so the only question was how do we get at special pricing request prior to 2003 and going back to 2001. After we filed our motion, the plaintiffs now say that they have produced those documents. However, they cited in their brief — they cite two examples and we know there are certainly more than two.

And so we'd like them to be ordered to produce those documents.

I'll make clear one thing. Their

papers suggest that we would -- the defendant
bureaus necessarily would have this very same
type of information in their own files and
that isn't the case, unfortunately. We're
willing and we'll take full advantage of the
information in our files but there are two
exceptions. One is there are special pricing
requests that from time to time get
communicated initially from a lender and
sometimes it gets memorialized and goes back
through a bureau but sometimes it gets

initiated by a lender and in that case we might not be privy to it.

And then, of course, the other obvious category is Equifax. If there are documents, special pricing requests made through Equifax over the years, they're not a party anymore and those are not documents that we can control and get, necessarily get unless we —

I suppose we could subpoena Equifax. So if indeed the plaintiffs have produced already the documents from 2001 to 2003 reflecting every special pricing request —

THE COURT: Well, that's what they've said several times to you. So the question is -- and then I saw where

Mr. Collyard used by way of example they were attached to his declaration as Exhibits 3 and 4, two letters by way of example, although the November 20, '08 e-mail from Nelson to Chris Sullivan which was Collyard declaration 2 said they had produced them as well.

Are you saying you want to know if these two letters are it or if there's more, you're saying you can't find them and give us the ID numbers?

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        there's nothing, well, I guess I hope that's
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        not the situation because I at least took from
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        their answer is that they had something and
        they actually produced it and that wasn't sort
        of a backward way of saying that there isn't
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        actually any documents. But whatever it is,
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        you're right, Your Honor. The question is
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        they should simply identify it.
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                         THE COURT: All right.
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                        MR. PACE: If you'd like, I
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        can stop or I can go on to 35.
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                         THE COURT: No.
                                          Let's stop
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               Mr. Collyard, I'll give you 15 minutes
        here.
        to address those three.
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                        MR. COLLYARD: I only need
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        about 15 seconds.
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                         THE COURT: Oh, good.
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                        MR. COLLYARD:
                                       I'm not going
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        to talk about any of the events that led up to
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        the motion. I'm sure you sensed my
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        frustration in the briefing.
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                         THE COURT: Yes, I did.
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                        MR. COLLYARD: And I made
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        this -- I tried to make this very, very, very
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        easy for you. And what the defendants have
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        done here is entered into a practice of
        bringing a motion. We say we produced it.
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        They say well, we can't find the documents,
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        make them identify them for us. With these
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        three particular requests we went ahead and
        did that. And we sent Jack Pace an e-mail I
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        believe sometime around, I don't know, 12:30,
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        1:00. So we didn't know if we'd be able to
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        get it done before the hearing. We did it
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        so --
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                         THE COURT:
                                     So you've
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        identified by Bates number the responsive
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        documents to document requests 8, 11 and 30.
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                         MR. COLLYARD:
                                        That's right.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     All right.
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        your position is that everything has already
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        been produced and now here's the Bates
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        numbers.
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                         MR. COLLYARD:
                                        Exactly.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     All right.
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                         MR. COLLYARD:
                                       Yep. We just
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        wanted to not even make this an issue, Your
23
        Honor.
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                                     You're right.
                         THE COURT:
        Pretty close to 15 seconds there.
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                         MR. COLLYARD:
                                        Thank you.
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                         THE COURT: All right.
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        Mr. Pace, anything else on document request 8,
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        11 and 30?
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                         MR. PACE:
                                   No, Your Honor.
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        With that representation on the record, I'll
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        take it.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     All right.
                                                  Well,
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        with respect to document request 8, 11 and 30,
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        my order was going to be that the plaintiff
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        identify by Bates number those documents that
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        were responsive to those document requests as
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        agreed to by the parties as to what was going
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        to be produced. And if indeed Mr. Collyard's
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        office has already done that, then you've just
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        complied with my order.
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               All right. Let's move on to document
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        request No. 35 which has to do with the
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        documents used by the Fair Isaac's employees
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        for these various public statements that were
21
        the subject matter of the requests for
22
        admissions, the second set of requests for
23
        admissions.
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                         MR. PACE: And, Your Honor, I
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        think at issue here --
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THE COURT: And here you're getting ten minutes for this one.

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MR. PACE: Okay. Thank you.

I won't need anywhere close to that.

I think there are really four documents It's two press releases and two earnings call transcripts. And I believe the only dispute that sort of surfaced as a result of the briefing was that the plaintiffs were offering to -- indicating that they would agree to identify documents used by the individual -- individual employees if they happen to have been identified in a particular, by name, in one of these press releases or transcripts. And our only difference was that we didn't accept that limitation because in a number of cases we didn't know -- for example, a press release is a good example or statement where we understand that there may be a lot of people working behind the scenes to support a statement made by the COO or the CEO. that limitation we don't know all the Fair Isaac employees who were involved in putting out a public statement. And from our

perspective the limitation was that I'm sure this is easy -- maybe I'm wrong. We are assuming, and I could be wrong, that this was relatively straightforward for them to find out whoever, for these four documents, whoever the employees were who were responsible for putting together those statements, the two press releases and the statements made on the two earnings calls, whoever they were, just what documents did they use in making those statements.

THE COURT: Let me make sure I understand what you're asking them to produce because this isn't clear to me for me. Are you seeking to have them produce -- I'm going to call this -- this is my term, not one you all used, either side -- the source documents for these four -- the two press releases and the two statements or are you asking them to produce the source documents for the statements which are the subject of your request for admissions?

MR. PACE: The former, Your Honor. The source documents for the statements in the press releases and the two

earnings call transcripts.

make sure I'm clear about it. Your request for admission says we're referring to this press release, we're going to ask you now request for admissions regarding it, and then you go through line by line as to what -- a statement that you pull out of a particular press release or statement that you want them to admit is true. And I'm assuming that this is not every statement, every sentence that was in those respective documents, those four documents. Am I right?

MR. PACE: Correct.

what I ask you, are you asking them to provide the source documents for the statements that you wanted them to admit in your request for admissions or are you asking them to provide the underlying source documents for those four, the two public -- or I'm sorry, press releases and the other two documents?

MR. PACE: It's those statements from those four documents that were identified in our request for admissions. So

it's -- we've narrowed it and identified the
statements.

THE COURT: All right. And then at one point it sounds like there was -- I don't know if the plaintiffs were offering this as a solution but I saw that the defendants rejected it but I want to make sure. If they were to produce all documents that were relied upon by whatever employees made those statements that are the subject of your request for admissions, relied upon by them, and produce those documents, would that be adequate?

MR. PACE: It would, Your

Honor. Just --

THE COURT: Whoever those employees are because apparently you don't know the names of all the employees who made the statements that show up in the press releases or these other statements.

MR. PACE: Yes, Your Honor, whether or not named. With that addition, we're -- that would be satisfactory.

THE COURT: So if they were to produce -- whether the employee was named or

MR. COLLYARD: You probably saw that in my e-mail to Mr. Pace, but I still don't know if I understand exactly what's at issue here. Because I asked -- you know, I asked Mr. Pace in my e-mail if they were limiting it to the particular statements in the --

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THE COURT: He said -- now he

2 said yes.

3 MR. COLLYARD: -- confirm

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5 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COLLYARD: Now, the only misunderstanding that I still have is, is it a document -- let me step back. Okay? have been many document requests in this case where this type of thing has come up about the statements that people have made. And for each of those we've limited it to the actual documents that the people actually relied on when making those statements. I just want to make sure I understand that what is meant by the underlying source documents. So if it is actually a document that, let's say, for example, Mark Green, the CEO of Fair Isaac had when he was making a statement, if he was looking at that, relying on that to make that particular statement, that is what I was offering to produce in the first instance. And I just want to make sure to see if I have the same understanding that you have now.

THE COURT:

Well, let me

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ask -- I would prefer to ask Mr. Pace if that's what he meant before I give my understanding of this.

MR. PACE: No, Your Honor. That -- that points to one slight disagreement that we had. We didn't -- we were concerned in the negotiations that this was being limited to, let's say a statement made about profit margins in an earnings call and, you know, new information to us, we see it for the first time in an earnings call. So we would like some document establishing that, whatever the source material for it is. The way it was being articulated to us in the negotiations and the way it was just articulated by Mr. Collyard, I believe, was if it so happens that Mark Green had a piece of paper in his hand and he was relying on a particular document to make that statement, then we'll give it to you. But if not, if instead, it was based on just information -- you know, something other than that specific precise document, then there's nothing to give you.

And I guess the reason that wasn't satisfactory to us was because we were

envisioning several scenarios where there might be other documents that would fall outside of that definition that we would be missing. You know, for example, if he gets regular briefings from his executive team with, you know, the results projections, et cetera, and based on that information he makes — he goes and makes a statement on an earnings call that's newsworthy, then under that articulation, we don't get that source material even if it's one document because it's not the specific thing he relied on.

THE COURT: Is that how your -- is that what you were proposing, so I'm clear?

MR. COLLYARD: What I was proposing is that it's a document that the speaker actually used, actually relied on, speaking statement --

THE COURT: Let's use, then,
the example Mr. Pace used. So Mr. Green has
briefing with a number of employees about a
particular item that he's going to speak on in
a public matter and he gets briefed and they
hand him different -- he reads a bunch of

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different materials or they report to him orally from a bunch of different materials and from that he gets up and makes a public statement for which he has clearly relied on materials prepared by others in order to make those statements. Under what you're proposing defendants wouldn't get that document?

MR. COLLYARD: That's right because think about how I have to go about searching for this, Your Honor. We've got 77 of these different statements and it's not just one statement in a statement. It's lines of statements. I would then have to go to Dr. Green and say, all right, now think about these 35 statements that they have listed for you. Each and every one of these we have to figure out if you've ever used anything at all, whether you were briefed on any of these, how did you come to learn this information because now we got to figure out the underlying information that gave you the knowledge. That becomes impossible to search for, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then

I'll continue to hear your argument and we'll

get back to you, Mr. Pace.

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 $$\operatorname{MR}.$  COLLYARD: That is the only argument that I want to make on this, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then let me ask a question because in your -the way I read your statement -- the way I read your client's response to the request for admission, I'm going to use this word in quotes, my word not yours or the other side's, they equivocated. In other words, they say -they don't just admit the statement is true. The way the statement is propounded or the request for admission is admit that this particular sentence is true as of this date and your client doesn't say admit, what they would say generally is in the context of which that statement was made they believed it to be true as of this date.

MR. COLLYARD: Right.

THE COURT: Which suggests to me some equivocation which is driving why the defendants want to get at the equivocation.

So I want to get back to what was going on there with what I'm calling the equivocation

or some wiggle room, creation of some wiggle room here.

MR. COLLYARD: See, this is why it's hard to talk about this in a vacuum. I don't know that that was done for each and every one of these 77 statements that they've cited and you got to consider what the actual statement is. So certain things are dated back in time. Their actual request for admission is admit that it's true. Okay. Does that mean that it's true today? Did that mean that it's true back then. Okay. A lot of these things are just statements, people talking.

THE COURT: When I went

back -- I will admit that I didn't go read all

of them but the ones I all read all said admit

that this particular statement true as of the

date it was made, this as of February 2, 2005.

Didn't say is it true today. The next

companion request for admission is did your

client -- did you ever retract it. Answer,

no.

MR. COLLYARD: But you got to remember on those particular statements

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it's -- some of those things are not things
that you could just actually admit as being
       It's someone just talking. Did that
particular person believe that it was true at
the time that it was made.
                            That's what we're
saying in those particular statements.
of those you cannot just come out and say yes,
that was absolutely true. We have no reason
for knowing that, Your Honor.
                               That was what
was so difficult about that and we tried to
explain that to the defendants.
                THE COURT:
                            All right.
Anything further on behalf of your clients on
No. 35.
                MR. COLLYARD:
                              No, Your Honor.
                THE COURT:
                            All right.
Mr. Pace, anything further that you want to
add on this?
                MR. PACE:
                           No, Your Honor.
                THE COURT:
                            All right.
                                        I'm
going to take that one under advisement at
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THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take that one under advisement at least for while we're here. I'm hoping I will issue an order on it before we leave here but I need to think a little bit more about what to do with document request No. 35. So I'm

going to move on at this point to the ninth set of document requests.

And the first ones I want to address are document requests 1 to 3 related to FICO 2008 having to do with, as I understand it, the date by which plaintiffs need to produce documents through. Mr. Pace.

MR. PACE: Your Honor identified the open issue with respect to 1 to 3. It's actually a similar issue with respect to 10 through 12 and that is just what's the cutoff date. There's an agreement to produce documents and the question is how hard do they have to produce documents.

For the FICO '08 documents, as we set forth in the papers that I won't repeat, our basis for asking for documents prior to the motion -- prior to filing of our motion, the plaintiffs were offering to produce documents up to February 15. We didn't think that was sufficient because the reasons we cite. We attached a press release I think and some other things. There's been significant marketing activity, communications with clients and other things with FICO '08. It's

going to affect the future of VantageScore which is the central question in the antitrust claims and as a result it was -- that was the basis for our request for information post-February 15.

After the motion, the plaintiffs agreed to produce the documents up to May 28, I think, which I believe was the date of our requests and I think the only difference was that --

THE COURT: At some point I think it's Sullivan declaration Exhibit 16 and, in fact, that at some point defendants did agree to produce it through the date of the request.

MR. PACE: That's right. And that may have been --

THE COURT: So why if it was good then, why isn't that a good agreement today?

MR. PACE: I guess because it may have been closer to the date of the request. In other words, at the time -- and you know, certainly time has passed and there are a lot of discovery issues that it appears

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both sides are raising that with the deadline coming up for nondispositive motions are sort of coming up now, and just given the passage of time, it took us a couple of months to negotiate it and then there were a few months between the end of negotiations on this I think, too, maybe and then the time we filed our motion. We certainly understand that the basis for a limitation of produce documents up to the date of the request is generally that it just makes sense to have a fixed time so that you don't have to keep going back. doesn't appear that the plaintiffs have done It doesn't appear, for example, that they said we've already produced documents up through a particular -- you know, up through May. So by your asking us to go to the present or, you know, November 24 I think was another alternative we put in our papers, that they would have to go back and do for a second time that which they've already done once. Rather, this is simply what we were treating as sort of a continuation of that sentiment. A continuation of the sentiment behind a sort of date of the request type of cut off. So

it's simply reflecting the passage of time
that it took to negotiate the request and get
the motion on file. And I think the offer was
initially made closer to the date of the
request and now we're in --

THE COURT: It was made on August 8, 2008 by Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Collyard is when that offer was made through May 28.

MR. PACE: So it's your position now that simply, you know, just given the passage of time and that we haven't been told by the plaintiffs that they would incur any additional expense by having to go back twice. In other words, they've already done a search through May and now they have to go back and do it. We thought if they're going to be doing the search, then given the fact that this is a current topic that's ongoing and changing, they should just do it as of the current — you know, up to the present time. That was the entire basis for the request, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Collyard, I'm assuming it's you until

somebody else hops up from your --

2 MR. COLLYARD: It's going to

be me for a while, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

They're all grinning. They're all loving the fact that they don't have to come up here.

All right.

MR. COLLYARD: Let me just show you the fundamental flaw in Mr. Pace's argument. Okay. It means that I could bring a motion here in the next three weeks for some dispute what we've had going way back and I'd say, Judge, because it was way back when, now I'm entitled to all of the documents up to the present. And as I explained in the brief, that would completely eviscerate the whole rationale for agreeing to what we were calling an ongoing document request in which you put forth in your scheduling order.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you a question, though. I understand from your brief that you have, in fact, produced the documents requested by 1 through 3 with the agreed upon limitations through February 15, 2008.

MR. COLLYARD: That's right.

The answer to

THE COURT: All right. And

3 with respect -- have you to date produced any

documents generated post-February 15, 2008?

5 In other words, did you produce --

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that is yes but have we made a complete

MR. COLLYARD:

8 production of these particular documents up to

9 May 28? No, we haven't. And just let me back

10 up and explain to you why is because during

our negotiations, and this is probably clear

in the brief, but during our discussions on

these, we always thought that they were

considering these to be ongoing document

15 requests. And I kept telling Mr. Pace during

these conversations it appears that the only

reason why you have served these documents

which were consumed by other document requests

on May 28 is so that we would have to somehow

20 make some type of production before the

21 ongoing document request production is due in

22 March of 2009. So for the first time in their

23 motion did I learn that they really did not

consider these to be ongoing requests. I had

25 been treating them as if they were ongoing

requests.

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THE COURT: Okay. So you get the letter from Mr. Sullivan on August 8 and he proposes through May -- that you produce documents through May 28, 2008 and then there's no response until right -- until this motion is filed.

MR. COLLYARD: No because even when I got Mr. Sullivan's letter that is the same argument that we had before, I had thought and they never told me otherwise that they were considering these to be ongoing document requests. And that was the fundamental disagreement that we had on these particular requests. So when I got their motion and they come out and say we are not at this time claiming that these are ongoing requests, that is when I said hey, if you're not claiming that these are ongoing requests, then, of course, we will produce the documents up to May 28. But what I do not want to have happen, Your Honor, is for them to then come back to you next week and say well, Judge, now that they've agreed to produce them up to May 28 and you've made them do that, now we

want these to also be considered ongoing documents requests. Because then we're back into the same position and the same discussion that Mr. Pace and I have already had numerous times now.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further you want to add on that?

MR. COLLYARD: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Pace, anything further you want to add on document request 1 through 3.

MR. PACE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. With respect to document request 1 through 3, I'm going to order that those documents responsive to those requests as agreed to with the limitations be produced through August 8, 2008 which is the date that was communicated by defendants to plaintiffs that they would limit the production through that date. I'm not going to order it through today. Obviously defendants could have brought this motion to compel several months ago and particularly when they got no response back from the plaintiffs on this. But I am going to order

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that they be produced through that date, the date when it was offered by defendants and then no response came back from plaintiffs. Just so I'm clear, this is not right now governed by any ongoing production. If you're going to get into that, you're going to have to have your meet and confer and tee that up for me as to whether one side or another thinks this should be subject to ongoing production. This is obviously -- I viewed this as a new request. I didn't read the correspondence as defendants taking this position, this was part of ongoing productions. But nonetheless, I'll make it perfectly clear this is not subject to the ongoing production that we've already got in place under the scheduling order.

All right. Let's go to document requests 10 through 12. This has to do with the deterioration of Fair Isaac's credit restoring. And let me ask a question for you, Mr. Pace. The scenario I got here is that Mr. Collyard has put in a signed declaration and we have another declaration by another individual as well saying that you had agreed

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that if they would go back to 2003, that the cutoff would be February 15, 2008. Ms. Nelson from plaintiff's office confirms that in an August 29 letter, which is Sullivan Exhibit 17, there's nothing in there where defendants ever said no in response to that In fact, Exhibit 16 dated August 8 from defendants seems to be suggesting the same solution. Your brief suggests that you told plaintiffs you rejected the whole proposal that it wasn't acceptable. You say that in your reply that these compromises were There was no cite in your reply so rejected. I confined anything where defendants ever even responded to the August 29, 2008 letter. appears to me there was agreement of the parties to go back to 2003 and through February 15, 2008 and now defendants don't want to live with that agreement. That's what it looks like to me.

MR. PACE: Okay. I
understand, Your Honor. And I will say I
don't -- while when we were preparing these, I
personally didn't specifically recollect the
making the offer of February 15 except I don't

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dispute anything in their declarations, I take them at their word. The reason that we at this point were seeking any documents after February 15 was that -- I quess just to step back for a second, the context of that particular meet and confer, as with many of these meet and confers, is that we have a laundry list of many, many requests where we're going through one at a time making suggestions, making proposals. And in this particular request what I understand took place, and this is consistent with what the declarations say, is that I told them basically, look, this is what we're looking for here. And as of this time, based on the information that I have available to me, if you -- our offer will be, along with all the other things we're making an offer of compromise for, we'll cut off -- we'll do a cutoff of February 15.

Now, that was one of many compromise offers made in that particular phone call which was followed by a letter from the plaintiffs that effectively rejected many, many, many of the things that we offered

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during that call. Now, I guess the reason that we're even here today still seeking documents after February 15 was that we thought that it was sort of unfair for them -for us to make a number of proposals which are sort of based contingent on an agreement and them to say we're rejecting a lot of these but we're going to pick and choose a couple and agree the limitations that are favorable to us, pick and choose those and agree and then live by those so at least we've now cut the universe and you can continue to negotiate with yourself, defendants, and just come back and as long as you move closer to us, we're not going to move closer to you. And so we saw that letter as really a rejection of a lot of the things we were doing and that's why we made the offer here today.

I will say, though, Your Honor, so it's clear, I have no interest in sort of going back on anything that we understood that they understood to be in agreement. And if Your Honor perceives it that way, I'm happy to live with the February 15 cutoff. But just to be clear, we saw that as really, their letter, as

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        a rejection of a lot of offers of compromise
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        by us such that we didn't think it was really
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        fair for us to have to be held to the one or
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        two that they latched on to which happened to
        be favorable to them.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     Okay.
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        Mr. Collyard. Let me ask a question. With
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        respect to these document requests 10 through
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        12, have plaintiffs produced the documents up
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        through February 15 that are responsive to
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        these document requests.
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                        MR. COLLYARD: We did, Judge,
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        and we actually did it a long time ago.
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                         THE COURT:
                                     Okay. All right.
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        I just wanted to clarify that. All right.
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        Anything that --
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                        MR. COLLYARD: The only thing
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        that I'll even -- that I even think I need to
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        respond to is obviously we didn't think that
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        there was any condition on our agreement.
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        didn't think it was if we agreed to all of
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        these issues today, then we'll live by this
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        agreement.
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confer we have we negotiate each document

Mr. Pace knows this. Every meet and

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request individually and that's how these were taken. I have nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Anything further, Mr. Pace, on document requests 10 through 12?

MR. PACE: No, Your Honor.

Thank you.

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THE COURT: All right. going to deny the motion on that. I do find that the parties had reached an agreement as of August 28 that the defendants would produce documents responsive to these document requests through February 15, 2008 and I do agree that at least as I have read through your various letters back and forth and as I would expect there will be negotiations as you go through each of these various discovery requests, some of which you'll reach agreement on, others you won't but I've never gotten the sense that it was an all or nothing bundling of either take everything or we're going to assume everything's off the table. certainly don't see, for example, defendants moving on everything that were the subject matter of various letters that went back and

forth between the parties. So in any event, I am denying the motion with respect to document requests 10 through 12 of the ninth set.

All right. Let's address, then, the Blaze Advisor or document requests 5 through 7.

MR. PACE: Finally, Your

Honor, with respect to 5 through 7, the simple issue is why are we still talking about EDM.

We had a motion on it. We have an agreed on protocol and then -- and we thought that was really the end of it. And then following the entry of that order, and I won't go through this in details, this is all in our papers, but following the entry of that order, then we listened in on another earnings call from the plaintiff where Mark Green, their CEO stepped back and said I'm going to discuss our EDM strategy. We're an EDM company now and I'll start with it all runs through Blaze Advisor.

THE COURT: All right. And I read that and read the annual report from 2005 and all of that and granted I am, as you all know, not savvy in this area but it certainly appears to me and what I see from the

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declaration provided by Mr. Caretta, that it looks like to me that a Blaze Advisor is basically a computer software program that is licensed out to third parties to -- in which they're putting in their data and I don't see the connection to what is at issue in this lawsuit which is the ability -- which is the FICO scores and the ability to -- whether there's a monopoly or not or are there distribution channels or are there not. just don't see, even if you assume that you were misled about what Blaze Advisor is, I don't see whether it falls under an EDM solution. It looks like an underlying software program from what I've been able to glean from what's been provided to me by the parties, including the various documents that you cited to me as well.

MR. PACE: Okay. Your Honor, that's our understanding as well that it's an underlying software program that clients use to help make their business decisions. And I think this really is the same issue that was before the court with respect to the prior EDM solutions. In connection with that, Your

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Honor got a very similar declaration that said we don't -- we, Fair Isaac, don't explicitly market these particular programs, Triad, other things, with scores. We don't specifically say here, client, we're going to sell you this in a specific bundle. So what do we do about And so our answer last time was the same answer this time. How does that explain the public statement saying that they're going to leverage their abilities in one area, EDM, Blaze Advisor, et cetera, to stabilize their other areas like scoring. And the only way that that makes any sense is to the documents that we cited to the Court in connection with the last motion, they're internal documents that talk about EDM more generally, that --I profess another reason why I'll excuse me. stop soon. I promise. That while the information and the products or services aren't explicitly comarketed even if they're not, that the fact is that once you have one client signed up for one underlying decisioning service like EDM, then it's all the more -- it's a lot easier to get them to subscribe to or buy FICO scores because

they're already involved, they're already using our solutions, they're already using our systems and it's a lot easier now for us to -- for them to use FICO scores that are automatically compatible with and as inputs or otherwise into the underlying software EDM or otherwise. And so even though -- and that's what the document said. The document said we'll leverage EDM solutions to sell more scores even though none of those particular programs were specifically marketed together. And that's supported by the documents that we subsequently got pursuant to the Court's order.

The documents that we got show a tremendous overlap between the client scores and the clients for EDM solutions. Now, that could be for a number of reasons. That could be because Fair Isaac is dominant in both and so that's just necessarily going to be the case. And if that's the answer, then I suppose that's the answer. But we were submitting that consistent with those documents and the public statements from their CEO, that that meant that getting people

subscribed to the Fair Isaac system in one area just made it easier and facilitated the purchase of scores or other things in another area. That was the only basis for the EDM motion in the first place.

So I agree, I haven't seen something specifically saying, and their declarations certainly don't say this, that the Blaze Advisor program is something that comes with FICO scores. I haven't seen that. We didn't see that before either and yet we sought all those documents discussing leveraging one versus the other. So it's really the same issue as before, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Collyard.

MR. COLLYARD: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Pace said that out of the documents that we produced from your March 20, 2008 order that he saw the clients were clients that were scoring clients and clients that were also EDM clients so there's some connection. Of course, that's the case, Your Honor, because as you made a limitation in your order, you said that we only had to

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produce documents from our top ten scoring clients. So we do have those clients who are scoring clients and who, with completely separate and apart items in their business, use EDM.

Now, Mr. Pace talks about references to cross selling and things like that. Those statements are made in connection with the overall EDM business. Cross sell use EDM applications to get more EDM applications.

But what I absolutely need to highlight for you, Judge, and this may have been clear from Mr. Caretta but it's so important that understand that why this doesn't make sense and why Fair Isaac could never use Blaze Advisor as a separate distribution channel for FICO scores is because we got to step back and Okay. All we have is an look at FICO scores. algorithm. That algorithm is housed with the They have it. We can do nothing bureaus. without the bureau's credit data. actually take that data, apply it to the algorithm. They do this. They process it. They make the score and then they themselves distribute the score. In every instance in

which a client of anybody's gets a score, it comes from the bureaus, not Fair Isaac. That is why Mr. Caretta says that we could never use Blaze Advisor for a separate distribution channel for FICO scores.

Now, I also want to point out too that when we talked about EDM last time, you found some very minimal relevance and because of the overwhelming burden in going out and getting these things, you tailored your order to a few particular things. One of those things, though, was all of the contracts and the statements of work from 2005 up to September 15 of 2007. Fair Isaac has produced, Your Honor, somewhere around 540 contracts and statements of use for that time period and that includes every single Blaze Advisor contract or statement of use --

THE COURT: Why would they have produced the Blaze Advisor contracts or statement of use if, in fact, Blaze Advisor wasn't covered by --

MR. COLLYARD: It was covered because it was out of -- out of all of the EDM products. You produce all those contracts for

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that time period. And so we produced every single Blaze Advisor statement of work that we had for that time period. Now, this was back in -- I can't remember when our production Your order was March 20 so I think our production was somewhere around April-ish. Okay. And that was on the eve of when we really started getting into all these depositions and not once, Your Honor, in defending 30 of these depositions did I ever see the defendants mark a single document pertaining to EDM. They never noticed up a Rule 30(b)(6) notice on this issue. Thev've done nothing on this issue and it's gone nowhere, Your Honor. Their economist expert, as I pointed out in the brief, has never even given an opinion as to how EDM or Blaze Advisor specifically could be used as some type of separate distribution channel. documents simply are not relevant, Your Honor. And Mr. Caretta explains that in detail.

But on top of that, Your Honor, not only do they have the 540 contracts for EDM and the statements of use that describe in detail exactly the statements of use, exactly

what is being done, they've never said why isn't that enough. They have all the Blaze Advisor stuff. Why should we have to go and get more. And as Mr. Caretta talks about, it would be a significant burden to go and do so. He talks about six different divisions of people that we would have to go and search. These are hundreds of people. We have nearly 350 Blaze Advisor clients that we'd have to have these people look for. It would be an enormous burden. As he says, it would take hundreds upon hundreds of hours to do so. We request that their motion be denied, Your Honor.

got any other questions for you. I'm still not clear if -- I understood the position you were taking in your response is that Blaze Advisor is not part of the EDM solutions and that by agreement of the parties, Blaze Advisor wasn't one of the solutions that you had to produce documents on. And in looking at my order with respect to document request 4 and 6 -- well, with 1 through 3 you were to produce the final contracts and statements of

work for the EDM solutions that were purchased from plaintiffs to the extent the documents exist. In agreement with respect to document request 4 and 6 is that you would produce any final presentations for Triad or Liquid Credit applications. In addition, you would produce the user guides for the following EDM solutions that were marketed or sold by them to the extent any such user guides exist for Triad, Liquid Credit, Capstone, Falcon and Debt Manager.

MR. COLLYARD: Right.

THE COURT: In other words,

Blaze Advisor wasn't listed.

15 MR. COLLYARD: Right. So let

16 me --

THE COURT: So where is it that -- just so I'm clear, I thought you were saying it's not an EDM solution but you're saying you produced it as part of the EDM solutions, the contracts and the statements of work.

MR. COLLYARD: So let me explain that for you. Blaze Advisor is one of the numerous applications that are part of

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Fair Isaac's EDM business. Remember, Fair
Isaac has its EDM business and then it has its
scoring business.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COLLYARD: Separate and apart from its scoring business is the rest of its business which Fair Isaac refers to as its EDM business. As part of that EDM business, Blaze application falls within that. your order on all the contracts and statements of work, we produced all the contracts we have for Triad, Liquid Credit, Blaze Advisor, anything that's considered to be an EDM solution. Now, where we got down on the particulars was in the final presentations. Okay. So when you gave your order and Mr. Pace and I talked about what final presentations do we need, he chose Triad, he chose Liquid Credit as being part of the -- as being part of those EDM applications. with the user guides. And so what they're saying, Judge, they're saying well, we really would have chosen Blaze Advisor instead of one of these if you hadn't tricked us. And that's how the they tricked us argument comes in.

And I don't even need to go to that.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Pace, anything further?

4 MR. PACE: Yes, Your Honor.

Very briefly. Just in response to the argument about how this doesn't make any sense because the CRAs are our distributors after all and all we do is make an algorithm and then something happens, I mean, obviously if that was the end of the story, then none of the other documents about, you know, leveraging scores and other services would make any sense.

I mean, all of the -- Fair Isaac regularly meets with, and there are many documents that have been produced in the FICO '08 context, for example, where they are regularly meeting with customers, clients talking about FICO scores. They're out there marketing and selling FICO scores. Granted, in most cases it's the bureau who ultimately sells it but it's not true at all -- I mean, I'm not saying he was saying that but to the extent Mr. Collyard could be heard to be suggesting or the declarations could be

suggesting that Fair Isaac has nothing to do with being out there pushing its scoring services in the marketplace, that's certainly not true at all.

With respect to have we used the documents, we have used the documents.

They're fairly straightforward. They're admissible evidence and they're going to see them in a few weeks in our summary judgment papers. The fact that we haven't used them in a deposition because they were coming in while depositions were ending has really -- is really here nor there.

And finally, with respect to the burdens associated with the production, Mr. Collyard is right. The Blaze Advisor stuff was included in the contracts that we got as a result of Your Honor's order. And so our requests 5 through 7 were specifically intended to track the remainder of the order that didn't cover contracts and we thought were narrowly tailored to get at the types of things that we thought actually weren't going to be that burdensome. Presentations, white papers, handouts used in connection with the

marketing or sale of Blaze Advisor, user guides and then documents sufficient to show market share. That last one could be a single document. So the user guides and the presentations from the negotiations with the plaintiffs before we were told or at least we came to understand that these were sort of standard sets of materials that were used that were often very duplicative that you didn't have to go to six divisions and a hundred employees to possibly get. If we're wrong about that, I suppose that's a conversation we probably should have had a few months ago about the burden but that's I guess why we're here today.

All we're looking for are those presentations, user guides in connection with Blaze Advisor. If Your Honor would like us to negotiate a limitation on that such that they don't have to go through six divisions and all those people to get, we're certainly happy to do that. Maybe standard user guides, if there's one, you know, if there's one that they use, the standard presentation, the standard white paper. Again, it was our

understanding that that's how the business worked. So what we were asking for here was probably only a handful of documents.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Collyard, anything further?

MR. COLLYARD: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. With respect to document request 5 through 7 of the ninth set of document requests, I'm going to deny the defendants' motion for those documents related to Blaze Advisor. I'm going to do so for several reasons.

First of all, I believe that that request was subsumed within document request No. 6 -- sorry. The six sets of documents that were the subject matter of ultimately a meet and confer by the parties and then what ended up being memorialized in my order of March 20, 2008. I find from the evidence that was presented to me by the parties in connection with their declarations and affidavits that the defendants were made aware of plaintiff's position on Blaze Advisor as of November 20, 2007. They responded by saying they disagreed with the position that

plaintiffs were taking about Blaze Advisor
being — that they disagreed and they would
follow up with it in connection with the sixth
set of document requests. They issued their
sixth set of document requests and ultimately
negotiated a resolution to it that took into
account Blaze Advisor. I don't find that
there is evidence that the defendants were
somehow tricked into thinking that Blaze
Advisor was something other than what
plaintiffs represented it to be in their
various documents that defendants have had
access to.

Second of all, to be honest, you know, all things could have some relevance but I really find that the relevance of Blaze Advisor is, at best, marginally relevant and certainly the burden of searching for those documents greatly exceeds any tangential relevance that this particular EDM solution would have in this case. I just think it is way too far afield.

So on that basis, based on that I think it's governed by my March 20, 2008 order, the relevance in this case is, at best, marginal

and certainly the burden well exceeds the benefit that could be obtained from obtaining the documents sought by document request 5 through 7. I'm denying defendants' motion with respect to that document -- those document requests.

With that, we're going to just take a short recess so that I can come back and give my ruling on document request No. 35 of the seventh set of document requests and then we'll go into the informal motion practice and get the others on the phone. So we'll take a five-minute recess. Thank you.

(A break was had in the proceedings)

THE COURT: You can be seated.

Sorry. Thank you. With respect to document request No. 35 of the seventh set of the document request, I'm going to -- just a moment, please.

Hello, Magistrate Judge Mayeron.

MR. GARDNER: Good afternoon again, Your Honor. This is Jim Gardner for Trans Union.

THE COURT: All right.

2 MR. MILNE: This is Robert

Milne again for Experian.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm just going to have you sit in on the balance, the tail end of the motion to compel by defendants. I'm just issuing a ruling on one of the document requests and then we'll be going into the informal motions. So bear with us here.

With respect to document request

No. 35, I am going to grant the defendants'
motion in part and I'm going to do it to this
extent. The plaintiffs will be ordered to
produce the documents sought by those document
requests. To the extent that the speaker of
those two press releases, and I think the
other two were year—end statements or
quarterly statements, to the extent that the
speakers had — were relying on documents as
they were making those statements, in other
words had them in their presence while they
were making those statements, those documents
will be produced.

But to the -- I am denying the motion

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to the extent it's asking the plaintiffs to go back and find all documents that could support those statements basically because -- for two One is it's just an incredibly reasons. burdensome request to do. And second, I weigh that burden against the nature of the plaintiff's responses. And while the plaintiffs do not outright admit these various document requests, I think that they are sufficiently admitted that defendants will be able to use their responses along with the fact that they also admitted they didn't retract those statements effectively at trial. So the burden is just too great, though, to ask the plaintiffs to go back and find sentence by sentence all of the documents that could have or did in fact support those statements. But to the extent that the speaker had documents in front of them that they were relying on to make those statements whether it be in a file or they were reading from them, have them in their presence, I don't want to say literally in their hand, Mr. Collyard, that I am going to order that those documents be produced. I think that

those speakers should know what they
physically had in their possession as those
statements were made and that can lessen the
burden significantly for plaintiffs. So
that's my ruling with respect to document
request No. 35.

Now, as I understand it, then, with respect to the seventh set of document requests, plaintiffs have already complied with document -- the order on document request 8, 11 and 30, that the letter has already been sent. For document request 35 I am ordering some relief and I'm also ordering relief on document request 1 through 3 of the ninth set of document requests.

When do plaintiffs believe they can get those documents to defendants?

MR. COLLYARD: Your Honor, I would propose that it happen -- remember there's a searching process and processing is (unintelligible). With the holidays, I would propose sometime in middle of January.

THE COURT: Well, I have Olson producing their documents on January 9 which is a little over a month from now. Would that

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1	be acceptable, doable?
2	MR. COLLYARD: Yeah. Can we
3	do it like this, Judge? We'll do it and if a
4	problem arises
5	THE COURT: Then bring it to
6	my then have a meet and confer with
7	defendants?
8	MR. COLLYARD: Yes.
9	THE COURT: And if you can't
10	resolve it, then bring it immediately to my
11	attention. But let's have those documents in
12	hand by January 9.
13	All right. Anything further on the
14	motion to compel by defendants before we go
15	into an informal conference and I release the
16	court reporter?
17	MR. PACE: Just for the
18	record, Your Honor, with respect to the 8, 11
19	and 30 that I believe the way Your Honor just
20	put it, plaintiffs have complied with
21	THE COURT: They represented
22	that an e-mail has been sent to you with those
23	Bates numbers.
24	MR. PACE: Just for the
25	record, I think it came when we were in the

Okay. That's correct. We had a per se price fixing claim I believe is what it was. And so but everybody knew that. I mean, it was exchanged up front. We had negotiations about that, including not a surprise to everybody we made the appropriate motion. So last night what we expected to get was the final version of the draft trademark cancellation claim that had been exchanged by the parties and I think the Court may have in fact seen that or it was done pursuant to stipulation rather. And what we get is that plus a 22 page, 78 paragraph section to monopolization claim against Fair Isaac. No warning about that, nothing. So that happens at 5:00. We get together. We

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1	those discussions, defendants and they're
2	asking you to stipulate because the time to
3	amend the complaint or amend the pleadings has
4	long since passed
5	MR. SCHUTZ: That's correct.
6	THE COURT: under the
7	scheduling order. And you have discussions
8	with the defendants and they or as part of
9	those discussions are looking to add a
10	counterclaim with respect to trademark,
11	correct?
12	MR. SCHUTZ: Cancellation of
13	the mark, yes.
14	THE COURT: And the parties,
15	because I didn't hear a motion, I know you
16	ultimately agreed. You submitted it to me by
17	stipulation.
18	MR. SCHUTZ: Correct.
19	THE COURT: And what I
20	remembered was that the parties agreed that
21	the plaintiffs could file their amended
22	complaint.
23	MR. SCHUTZ: Yes.
24	THE COURT: Now, are you
25	saying that part of the stipulation which I

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these additional claims, our per se claim and their cancellation claim because they had a cancellation affirmative defense and so it was all up there.

THE COURT: Okay. And now you're saying all of a sudden you had a new claim comes in.

MR. SCHUTZ: Brand new claim It's antitrust claim under Section comes in. 2 against Fair Isaac. It's a standalone claim and it comes in last night at 5:00. before I get to the discovery aspects in just a moment, I think it's helpful to step back and say, all right, what does that mean and what are the ramifications of this. aside the dispute that we've got here about expert discovery, what happens with this if this claim were not stricken and allowed to go forward. Well, one way to look at it is what if they filed it as a new suit, just filed an antitrust suit against Fair Isaac. something that probably would result in a year and a half to two year discovery schedule. mean, these Section 2 monopolization claims are very complicated. Well, what does it mean

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for this case? Certainly the whole schedule is blown up by filing — if this claim is allowed to stay in this case and is not stricken. It's going to require separate damage experts. It's going to require new opinions on antitrust and economics and market share or all the acts. I mean, it goes on for 70 paragraphs.

So keeping that as background, the first thing we do when we look at this we see paragraph No. 1, quote, Fair Isaac Corporation currently is and has been for many years a virtual monopolist in the credit scoring industry. So that's how they start out charging us with being a monopolist. Paragraph 2 starts out, while ostensibly directed to the recent launch of the VantageScore credit scoring services, this lawsuit is, in fact, the culmination of several years worth of efforts by Fair Isaac to fraudulently obtain through, the federal trademark registration process, exclusive rights and in numerical range 300 to 850 for the purpose of maintain its dominant position in the credit scoring industry, and it goes

on.

So it appears, what appears to us is happening is they filed this antitrust counterclaim without seeking permission, without -- past the April 1, 2000 deadline for filing an amended claim and it's 5:00 the night before they're to take the trademark expert in our case and it's clear that they are tying that in now to our monopolization claim because paragraph 1 calls us monopolists. Then they talk about how we used our 300, 850 score and the trademark registration process to cement our dominant position and it goes on and on, of course.

So we're being sandbagged. We're absolutely being sandbagged here. There's been no report by them on this. Our expert hasn't done anything with regard to how that might tie into cementing a dominant position. So we said wait a minute. There isn't going to be a deposition go forward until we're able to sort this out. They said well, we're going to get a hold of the court 9:00 tomorrow morning. We said fine, we'll bring it up then, at which point we fully intended to seek

defense?

MR. PACE: Your Honor, if I could briefly and then Mr. Gardner or

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Mr. Milne --

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All right. THE COURT: ask a question as you're coming up here. the picture that Mr. Schutz has painted is you have filed an unauthorized counterclaim, meaning the deadline to amend the pleadings to add claims or parties was April 1, 2007 and so the time has passed to add one without a motion to this Court and establishing good cause to bringing the motion at this time. So before I address, then, the fact that they didn't bring a motion for protective order, what basis, given apparently there was, according to them and you'll correct them if they're wrong, no agreement to add this counterclaim, there was only an agreement to add this trademark counterclaim.

MR. PACE: I will correct them because they are wrong about this. But we believe the counterclaim is proper, that we have a right to file it in response to their new complaint and that in any event, it's beside the point at the moment if they want to file a motion to strike, they certainly can but it has nothing to do with the depositions

going on. Mr. Schutz went through and cited -- read from the first couple paragraphs of our antitrust counterclaim. It has nothing to do with the trademark claims. We make no mention at all of -- the only trade -- the only counterclaim that talks about their fraud on the patent office in obtaining the 300, 850 scoring range --

THE COURT: The patent office or trademark office?

MR. PACE: The patent and trademark office, PTO. Sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PACE: Is the claim that they've not only seen for months but they've also submitted an expert report on. So that one they've known about forever.

The history, Your Honor, just so we're clear, is several months ago, as Mr. Schutz mentioned or may have -- or actually, as Your Honor mentioned, the defendants, when it was revealed in discovery that the -- that the plaintiffs had obtained their registration for the numeric scoring range, 300, 850, we thought, based on a fraud on the PTO, we file

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a motion for a leave to amend our complaint to assert the trademark counterclaim. That was That's what came first. This was step one. before any word of any new complaint by them. That came first. Then after that the plaintiffs proposed to us that oh, by the way, we're filing an amended complaint anyway. in an e-mail that we got from the plaintiffs on August 28, after our motion was filed and they -- and this was in the context of their draft new antitrust count, the first count that the plaintiffs were talking about that they sent us, and we were talking about what do we do with our existing motion for leave, they said we'd like to know whether your clients will consent to this amendment, their amendment to their complaint or whether a motion will be necessary. An amendment to their complaint would eliminate the need for your clients to go forward with their motion to amend the pleadings given that you could too so as a matter of right in response to Fair Isaac's pleading. Please let me know the position of your clients.

So then what happened next was -- and

while all of this is going on, as Your Honor knows, the discovery of the Equifax settlement which only happened over the summer, continued. And as Your Honor also knows, that's not even resolved yet. You know we still have a privilege log. And that's the next item for Your Honor coming on some of the documents relating to the Equifax settlement. We think, they may not agree, but we think it's a obviously a key issue that changes the case. And so that discovery is going on while all this is happening up until this week and including this week, Your Honor.

And so while all this is going on, we then, as a result of the plaintiff's proposal, we enter into a stipulation. And Your Honor signs an order that speaks generally about the deadline for amended complaints and answers and it provides a deadline for within three business days of — this is Your Honor's order on November 6. Within three business days of the order, the plaintiffs are to file their third amended complaint.

Then, number two, the defendants must answer or otherwise plead in response to the

plaintiffs third amended complaint within 20 days of service of the complaint. There were no restrictions on what we could say in response to their complaint. Perhaps following the e-mail we got from the plaintiffs on August 28 it was an answer and counterclaims made as a right.

And then number three, the plaintiffs must file any answer or other pleading in response to the defendants' responsive pleading within 20 days. In other words, it was obviously specifically contemplated that they might be responding to whatever counterclaims we filed.

Now, we added -- it's true. I assume they didn't know about our antitrust counterclaim until we filed it. This is a new issue, Your Honor. This is the -- the Equifax settlement is something that just happened a couple months ago and as to which we've gotten some discovery but we're still seeking discovery. And the primary basis for our antitrust counterclaim is the Equifax settlement. I have a copy -- I think Your Honor got a courtesy copy yesterday of ours

for Experian but we can go through it. I mean, the primary basis for that counterclaim, there's lots of other facts in there but a primary basis is the Equifax settlement. And so that's the reason why it was filed yesterday. Yesterday being our next opportunity to file an answer and any counterclaims.

But I guess I just return to the point of what does the antitrust counterclaim have to do with the depositions that were going on today and tomorrow and what happens next. Are the plaintiffs simply able to, because of the existence of a counterclaim, that if they want to move to strike they may? Do they have the ability to just unilaterally halt all proceedings in the lawsuit and say okay, we're just going to do nothing until we resolve this issue about your counterclaim?

We think obviously -- we respectfully suggest that they don't have the ability to do that. We were on a schedule. Your Honor set a schedule that had a very tight expert deposition schedule over the next few weeks. We worked very hard to schedule 11 depositions

experts and survey experts and Kevin Murphy,
the defendants' economist. Did I miss one
next week?

THE COURT: And are you saying that none of these depositions, either theirs or yours, would be affected by this counterclaim, your antitrust counterclaim?

MR. MILNE: Your Honor, if I might. This is Robert Milne for Experian. To answer your question, I mean, all of these expert depositions relate to the long pending claims asserted by Fair Isaac. They -- that is the subject matter of these depositions. There are expert reports that have gone in, rebuttal reports have gone in and they all pertain to those existing claims.

And I wanted, if I might also to just comment on one other thing that Mr. Schutz was describing. He made it sound as though this new antitrust counterclaim was a brand new thing that if we started this case from all over, they'd get two years of discovery in, that we'd have to kind of start all over here because of this.

Now, as Mr. Pace mentioned, the

gravamen of that antitrust claim is what we think is the anticompetitive agreement that Fair Isaac entered into with Equifax. The background to it, the relevant market, all of that sort of material is material which is — it has been developed in the discovery process that has occurred in the existing matter. So, you know, we are not embarking on some completely new tangent, but there is a new development and recent development, that is this agreement, that we think brings — crosses the line and warrants this claim.

THE COURT: All right. Here is what I'm going to do on this issue. I am -- we need to tee up this issue about the propriety of the counterclaim, whether it's teed up as a motion to strike it or a motion to amend to add it. Obviously, defendants think they had no obligation to bring a motion. I suspect plaintiffs will disagree or may disagree about that. In any event, you've indicated, Mr. Schutz, that you're going to bring a motion to strike.

That said, this case is going to proceed as it is currently postured, meaning

that until a decision is made on that counterclaim, I'm not going to hold up any discovery on this case, expert discovery or otherwise. If that counterclaim remains in the case, then I will cross that bridge at that time as to what impact that has on the case and whether parties should be able to seek costs or reimbursement on one side or the other for having been put through the exercise if the counterclaim is in or if it's not in.

But to be honest, given the lateness of bringing that counterclaim, however it came to pass, has the potential of having an enormous impact on this case and certainly one that needs to be fleshed out by the parties, but I don't want to stop this case right now from proceeding as it is currently postured, meaning the day before that antitrust counterclaim was made.

So I want those depositions to go
forward tomorrow and the ones that are
scheduled next week. I also want to get this
issue teed up on an expedited basis if it's
going to be framed as a motion to strike the
counterclaim or if defendants do decide

that -- whatever they want, however they want to posture it, but I want to tee up this issue as to whether that claim is going to be in or out of the case on an expedited basis. So that means getting briefs and responses to me on a very quick turnaround. We just can't let that one languish while you all are continuing to do this expert discovery which is unfortunate because this always happens right at the holiday time.

So I guess I'm going to say to plaintiffs who have said they're going to be bringing a motion to strike how soon can you get that motion teed up to me and then we're going to need a quick response by defendants? Can you get it teed up by Wednesday?

MR. SCHUTZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT: By this coming Wednesday which would be -- well, Steve stepped out. There you are.

MR. SCHUTZ: Your Honor, one of the problems that we have is we have depos and prep and we have a lot of key people that are --

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want to come in, that's fine as well but we

the hearing will be but it will be that next

Wednesday. So one of those days. And if you

week somewhere between Monday through

want to appear by phone, that's fine.

need to address that issue.

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But in the meantime, we're not going to stop these depositions from going forward.

And I will have to deal with what relief is appropriate after I decide the motion to strike.

MR. SCHUTZ: One concern from the trenches, Judge, as we go into these depositions, I mean, one of the concerns we've got, notwithstanding, you know, the comments by Mr. Milne, we were sandbagged with this. We think that the defendants are going to try to use these expert depositions to support this counterclaim in which case we think that's where they're going. We may be back to the court in the middle of these depositions seeking a protective order for them going outside the allowed claims at this point and trying to actually use the expert depositions as a subterfuge to gain further support for their counterclaim. That's our big concern here, Judge.

THE COURT: I guess we're going to have to cross that bridge. You know, you're always free to call me during a deposition. You're always free to make a

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record of what your objection is. I would expect that the depositions at this point are going to be confined to the amended complaint as agreed to by the parties which was to add your price fixing claim and the trademark counterclaim. That's going to be the four corners of what's going to be explored. Obviously the expert reports that go with all those claims and defenses. Clearly it wouldn't surprise me if some of what they do may, at the same time, in light of what Mr. Milne said, also support a new suit or a -- their antitrust counterclaim. It may serve a dual purpose. As long as it serves a dual purpose -- as long as it serves the purpose of the amended complaint and the amended counterclaim with the trademark that -- you're going to be within your rights to explore those areas. If it looks like it's going well outside it, I expect the parties will raise that issue.

MR. MILNE: And, Your Honor, may I raise one question, just point of clarification because I could imagine that might come up next week?

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know that the Equifax agreement with plaintiffs is an issue in this case. fits with the claim before this antitrust counterclaim was served last night I can't opine on that at this point but your point is taken and I think we're just going to have to see how these depositions go. Your experts have issued reports and presumably that's what you're going to be questioning them about. But I don't want to -- I can't give guidance at this point on it other than to say I'm going to be looking at the deposition to be taken as the way this case looked before that antitrust counterclaim was served. MR. SCHUTZ: And that's the way we would expect it to be taken, Judge. But based on Mr. Milne's statement, they're going right to the antitrust counterclaim they filed against Fair Isaac.

MR. MILNE: That is -- Your Honor, that is certainly not the intent and we

will be focusing on the issues in the case.

THE COURT: All right. Okay.

Well, we need -- as I said, we're not going to stop the discovery and we need to get the

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1	issue teed up quickly. So I will actually
2	not tomorrow. Tomorrow is Saturday. On
3	Monday we'll send out a date for the hearing
4	time and date for the hearing. It will be
5	that Monday through Wednesday before
6	Christmas.
7	All right. Let's address, then, the
8	issue of the privilege log. You all were
9	going to confer about how to read what the
10	obligations of the parties were. Did you come
11	to any resolution on this?
12	MR. PACE: We did, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: All right.
14	MR. PACE: And just very
15	quickly. The one issue is with the one
16	final issue on the counterclaim is I guess we
17	still have a question about what happens with
18	the deposition that got canceled today.
19	THE COURT: It's going to have
20	to get rescheduled.
21	MR. PACE: Okay.
22	THE COURT: Obviously it's
23	MR. SCHUTZ: We'll work with
24	them, Judge.
25	THE COURT: You're going to

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have to work with them to get this rescheduled, and if there were — if there are issues with that or there are costs that were incurred as a result of that cancellation that you feel defendants shouldn't have to bear, you can take it up with me but understand now I have a better understanding of that it took two to tango as usual that created the issue here before me. But in any event, it needs to be scheduled.

MR. SCHUTZ: Yes.

MR. PACE: Okay. With respect to the privilege logs, we did reach an agreement, Your Honor. We both went back to our clients and looked at the documents that would be affected and agreed, and Mr. Tietjen certainly should correct me if I get any of this wrong, that we -- the parties would continue to act as they have been acting in interpreting the Court's -- the provision in the scheduling order with respect to a privilege log cutoff. In other words, with the exception of two categories I'm about to identify, the parties would continue to treat the language in the Court's order that said

the parties shall not be required to log work product materials or attorney-client privileged communications relating to the claims and defenses in this lawsuit. After a certain date, the parties would treat that language as just a general cutoff for both sides for privilege logs based on the respective cutoff dates, June '06 for the plaintiffs, October '06 for the defendants.

However, as a compromise, both sides agreed to identify a category of issues that the parties believed were kind of more current issues that for -- that weren't litigation type documents, weren't pleadings, client updates, et cetera, but that were the types of documents that were more substantive on current issues for which a privilege log might be helpful.

And we have a stipulation that we're going to just review one last time and sign and submit to Your Honor that identifies the two sets of requests of the defendants. It's the tenth set of requests that plaintiffs will identify -- will log documents responsive to those and -- for the plaintiffs they've

identified and for the defendants we will log documents responsive to the request 1 through 8 of their eighth set of requests to Experian and Trans Union or to VantageScore. That's the sixth set of requests.

So we've come up with a compromise that identifies more recent issues that we will log. Otherwise, we will continue to act as we will. The stipulation that we'll submit will include the language in Your Honor's scheduled order and the way that we think it could be revised slightly to allow for this probability and make it consistent with practice.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Tietjen, does that accurately reflect your agreement?

MR. TIETJEN: Well, it was nice of Mr. Pace to state it more (unintelligible) than it actually was. They said you give us a log on that tenth set but we're going to make you log everything and if you want something in return, you can have it. So we said okay, we'll give you a little longer on the tenth set if it means so much to you and we'll ask for a log, then, on all

further on the phone?

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